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SECOND INTERIM REPORT

ON

NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE

Prepared by the North Atlantic Assembly's Special Committee on Nuclear Weapons in Europe

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A REPORT

TO THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

JANUARY 1983

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

JANUARY 28, 1983.

Hon. CHARLES H. PERCY,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: By the time of President Reagan's inauguration in January 1981, it had become clear that NATO's dual-track decision of December 1979—to modernize its intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) while seeking negotiated East-West limits on such weaponry—had become a subject of major controversy within the Atlantic Alliance. Although NATO's history is replete with instances of internal dispute, debate over INF appeared to be expanding into the realm of citizen discussion far more than had previous issues. Because this growth in "grass roots" concern had obvious implications for the solidarity of an alliance that depends upon political consensus, the North Atlantic Assembly—NATO's interparliamentary arm—determined early in 1981 to establish a Special Committee on Nuclear Weapons in Europe to study the political and military aspects of INF modernization and arms control. The guiding premise was that a group of parliamentarians representing a cross-section of views from NATO's 15 (now 16) member-nations could contribute to both governmental and public understanding of the complexities surrounding the INF issue.

Since its creation, the Special Committee has conducted extensive interviews in Washington, Bonn, London, Brussels, the Hague, Rome, Paris, and SHAPE headquarters in Belgium. Those interviewed include officials from current and past governments involved in the NATO decision, groups of parliamentarians, experts on strategic issues, and leaders of European and American citizen groups opposing new nuclear deployments. The initial result of these efforts was a first interim report, drafted by the Special Committee's rapporteurs and presented at the Assembly's 27th Annual Session, held in Munich during October 1981. Through the subsequent year, the Special Committee continued its work, which led to the presentation of this second interim report at the Assembly's 28th Annual Session, held in London last November.

At both Assembly sessions, the Special Committee initiated a Resolution on Nuclear Weapons in Europe, which in each case won overwhelming support during the Assembly's formal plenary voting. The essence of the Assembly's 1981 Resolution was to affirm the validity of NATO's December 1979 two-track decision. The 1982 Resolution, passed in November, reaffirmed support for the dual-track approach, while drawing attention to the advantages of a prompt modernization of the Alliance's *short-range* nuclear posture. I outlined these advantages in a statement, reprinted in this report, which I delivered to the

Assembly during the discussion and debate that preceded the Assembly's vote on the 1982 Resolution.

For more than 2 years, the INF issue, in both its deployment and arms control aspects, has dominated deliberations within the North Atlantic Alliance—and, accordingly, among parliamentarians of the North Atlantic Assembly. I am pleased that during this period the Special Committee's products—its interim reports and its proposed resolutions—have won widespread endorsement from NATO parliamentarians. In the belief that the most recent of these documents contain information valuable to public discussion of NATO's future, I respectfully submit them for publication.

Sincerely,

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
Chairman, Special Committee
on Nuclear Weapons in Europe.

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RESOLUTION ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE

(Adopted by the North Atlantic Assembly on November 18, 1982)

The Assembly,

Recalling its 1981 Resolution on Nuclear Weapons in Europe, which stressed the far-reaching significance of NATO's 1979 decision to achieve a modernisation of its theatre nuclear forces while seeking negotiated East-West limits on such forces;

Re-emphasising the importance of sustaining a public consensus behind this dual-track decision;

Expressing concern about ongoing Soviet deployments of the SS-20 and other Soviet improvements in theatre nuclear forces;

Welcoming the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) negotiations and Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) in Geneva;

Convinced that NATO's firm determination to modernise is essential to progress in such negotiations;

Aware that public opposition to scheduled theatre nuclear force deployments may increase in the absence of progress in the INF negotiations;

Supporting strongly a "zero-zero" outcome of these negotiations, as proposed by President Reagan, as the best possible outcome; but

Concerned that this or another acceptable outcome of the INF talks may not be forthcoming prior to the first NATO deployments scheduled for late 1983;

Noting the need for NATO to promote public understanding of and support for its nuclear strategy of deterrence through flexible response and, in this respect,

Welcoming the review of short-range nuclear systems by NATO's High Level Group aimed at rationalising and, if possible, reducing NATO's reliance on short-range nuclear weapons;

Urges member governments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

1. to maintain firm adherence to both elements of the 1979 decision with equal emphasis;

2. to continue efforts to explain clearly and persuasively the role of nuclear weapons in Alliance strategy, and, more specifically, to promote public understanding of current negotiations by

   —calling attention to the "zero-zero" proposal adopted by the Alliance as sound and reasonable, while emphasising NATO's willingness to consider other mutually acceptable outcomes;

   —explaining more clearly the complexities involved in such negotiations and the realistic prospects for early agreement;

3. to encourage appropriate High Level Group studies and implement the conclusions thereof, directed towards reducing the Alliance's reliance on short-range nuclear weapons in order both

   —to strengthen the credibility of Alliance military policy, and

   —to fortify public confidence in the rational basis of NATO's deterrent posture.

STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. (USA), CHAIRMAN, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE

NATO's TNF: Modernizing While Building Public Support

One year ago in Munich this Assembly approved with virtual unanimity a resolution affirming continued support for the important NATO decision of December 1979, which was to undertake a modernization of the Alliance's theater nuclear forces but, on a second track, to seek stabilizing East-West limits on such forces at the lowest possible level on both sides. NATO had taken that decision for valid reasons. First, the attainment of parity in intercontinental nuclear forces had brought added import to East-West disparities in other areas of military capability. Second, NATO's long-range theater nuclear force capabilities, mostly in the form of aircraft, had begun to erode seriously, due both to aging and to improving Soviet air defenses. Third, against this background the Soviet Union had undertaken an expansive effort to modernize its own theater nuclear force capabilities. The NATO allies determined to respond in kind, but with hope of attracting the Soviet Government to the bargaining table.

The central purpose of NATO's December 1979 decision was to retain a strategic link between West European-based and U.S.-based forces which would, in addition to its military benefits, reassure public opinion of the continuing validity of our defensive plans and posture. But my colleagues will recall, no doubt vividly, that our meeting in Munich came in the wake of a series of impressively large public demonstrations in Europe manifesting concern over the danger of nuclear war and, in some cases, opposition to the nuclear deployment plans inherent in NATO's 1979 decision. The Assembly's purpose 1 year ago was to underscore that, if we are in fact to succeed in limiting the danger of war, NATO's two-track plan reflects not only the best but indeed the only practical and responsible policy. That policy, stated generally, is to maintain military strength at any level necessary to deter aggression and, from that position of strength, to pursue negotiated East-West arrangements designed to solidify the peace.

Indeed, for those familiar with the history of Western defense policy, the 1979 two-track decision represents no more than a new application of the old Harmel formula defining NATO's dual goals as "defence and détente." But our publics have nonetheless felt a growing sense of alarm, which they have expressed openly and sometimes passionately through the very democratic means that NATO exists to defend. That they should do so is not only their right but also quite understandable. Nuclear war is a horrifying specter and, whatever its likelihood, a real danger. With East-West relations in decline and the SALT II Treaty in uncertain suspension, with both superpowers proceeding apace in the further expansion of nuclear

arsenals that already contain apocalyptic potential, and with careless rhetoric trembling the air, we can hardly find surprising the spread of sincere apprehension within our collective citizenry—and across the entire political spectrum as we customarily define it. In my own country, the call for a "freeze" on the world's apparent nuclear madness has been heard not only from idealistic students but also, with equal fervor, from the country town meeting halls that symbolize the bedrock of political conservatism. A desire for survival is neither liberal nor conservative; our people wish to live.

How shall we, as elected representatives, respond to such genuine and widespread pleas? Our duty, as I discern it, is neither to ignore the outcry nor to heed it indiscriminately. Instead we must lead in order to serve.

Our nations face, in the form of the Soviet Union, a formidable adversary. We can protect our publics from war with that adversary only by continuing to maintain strength with determination while pursuing negotiations with sincerity. On the issue of theater nuclear forces, that means maintaining firm adherence to NATO's two-track decision of 1979—with equal emphasis on both tracks. Thus the resolution now before the Assembly would, as a first step, reiterate our support for deployments to the degree necessary and negotiated limitations to the degree possible. But it would do more.

As a second step, it calls upon our governments, and implicity upon all of us, to speak clearly and persuasively in support of the 1979 decision, the rationale behind it, and current Alliance efforts to implement it—including the negotiating effort now underway in Geneva. My colleagues will note that the resolution's language mentions NATO's willingness to consider, in addition to the zero-zero position the West has put forward, "other mutually acceptable outcomes." This, I should stress, is not a call for abandonment of the zero-zero position which the Alliance now favors as the optimum outcome and which can serve as a standard of evaluation for Soviet counterproposals. But we are in a *negotiation*. To suggest that we are *not* willing to consider other proposals would be to confirm the worst fears of our skeptics, which is that the Geneva talks are no more than a placebo for public opinion.

The third provision of the resolution, which may be slightly controversial, proposes that a useful relationship may exist between two NATO needs which are not, in an immediately obvious way, related. I refer first to the need, rflected in a current High Level Group review, to reexamine and revise NATO's doctrine for and deployments of short-range nuclear systems. Second, I refer to NATO's need to fortify public opinion behind the TNF deployment plans without which our negotiating position in Geneva would have little hope.

It has for many years been understood, at least by experts, that NATO's short-range nuclear posture is badly in need of overhaul. Some systems are outdated; some indeed have never been associated with a truly rational or credible concept of usage. This realization has slowly spread. Unfortunately, always militating against any change, in addition to the usual institutional inertia, were (1) a concern that any reductions in nuclear warheads might occasion public alarm over a weakening of the American commitment to European defense

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and (2) a belief that such warheads should be used as bargaining chips in MBFR or other negotiations.

Now, however, that argumentation is obsolete, along with many of the weapons themselves. Weapons have value as bargaining chips only when the other side perceives that they have value. It is certainly not lost on the Soviets that NATO is increasingly skeptical of the value of a number of its own short-range nuclear systems—most particularly, atomic-demolition mines and anti-aircraft missiles but also some nuclear artillery and rockets. This growing skepticism has resulted in the High Level Group's current review.

What the third section of the resolution expresses is the desirability of completing that review promptly and then implementing it—without yielding to any temptation to believe that anachonistic nuclear systems should be retained as bargaining chips for Geneva. The biggest bargaining chip we can bring to Geneva is solid public support for the two -track decision. That support has been cast into uncertainty by public fear that events are out of control and that NATO and its people are caught up in a deadly escalation of nuclear armament. It might possibly have been true in the past that unilateral reductions in NATO warheads would create public concern. But that is hardly true today. Indeed, far from alarming our publics, such action now would demonstrate clearly that NATO is engaged not in the blind acquisition of ever more destructive power but in the maintenance of a rationally conceived deterrent posture.

I recognize that some among us react instinctively against responding to the political pressures created by the so-called peace movement. What is suggested here, however, is not a pandering to public opinion at the expense of our real collective needs. Instead we have the opportunity to meet two needs at once: to rationalize our short-range nuclear posture while at the same time strengthening our hand in the longer-range negotiations in Geneva. That is not pandering; that is leadership.

SECOND INTERIM REPORT ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE

COMPOSITION OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE

Chairman:

Senator Joseph Biden (United States) (Democrat).

Vice Chairmen:

Mr. Klaas G. De Vries (Netherlands) PVDA).
Mr. Klaus Francke (Federal Republic of Germany) (CDU).

Rapporteurs:

Mr. John Cartwright (United Kingdom) (SDP).
Mr. Julian Critchley (United Kingdom) (Conservative).

Members:

Mr. Lasse Budtz (Denmark) (Social Democrat).
On. Massimo De Carolis (Italy) (Christian Democrat).
Mr. Jacques Chaumont (France) (RPR).
Mr. Peter Corterier (Federal Republic of Germany) (SPD).
Senator Severino Fallucchi (Italy) (Christian Democrat).
Mr. Einar Forde (Norway) Labour).
Mr. Michael Forrestall (Canada) (Progressive Conservative).
Mr. Jacques Huyghues des Etages (France) (Socialist).
Senator Larry Pressler (United States) (Republican).
Mr. Marcel Remacle (Belgium) (Socialist).

SUMMARY

The report begins with a brief description of the evolution of NATO's nuclear doctrine and capabilities, noting the various phases through which the Alliance has passed in attempting to make "extended deterrence" credible. In this respect it notes the work of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) in developing NATO doctrine for the use of theatre nuclear weapons. The report assesses Soviet theatre nuclear capabilities, noting the most recent estimates of SS-20 deployments.

With regard to the proposal to modernise NATO's TNF, the report outlines the basic elements of the NATO 12 December double-track decision and then analyses the principal issues that have occupied the Special Committee's attention: the rationale for the modernisation proposal and the consequent national differences concerning the objectives of NATO's current decision; the reasons for the choice of 572 as the number of warheads to be deployed; the current status of the implementation of the modernization programme; revived interest in the sea-based option and official opposition to this suggestion: the current work of the HLG; and the policy of the Reagan administration towards Alliance nuclear strategy.

The report then examines the arms control track of the double-track decision by describing the evolution of the arms control approach agreed by the Alliance in 1979 and the negotiating positions proposed by the Reagan administration and the Soviet Union now under discussion in Geneva. The report comments that the opening positions adopted by the two sides in the INF negotiations are very far apart. The report then examines the Soviet and U.S. positions in strategic arms negotiations.

The chapter on Problems and Prospects summarises the main points that have emerged from the Special Committee's deliberations: the determination to maintain the 12 December consensus; the importance of achieving progress in both the START and INF negotiations; the need to look for an acceptable variation of the zero option; and finally the need for the Alliance to review its nuclear strategy, chiefly through reductions in its battlefield nuclear forces.

Pertinent developments in the five NATO members already committed to deployment or considering their decisions are reviewed in chapters on the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy and Belgium. Two chapters are also devoted to the positions and proposals of the United States and the Soviet Union. The report concludes with summaries of the Special Committee's Meetings with officials and experts in Holland and France in March 1982.

Please note: The Rapporteurs have chosen to incorporate in this report all pertinent, significant material from the report they prepared for the 1981 session. To facilitate reading, all substantially new paragraphs are identified by an asterik.

INTRODUCTION

1. During the past few years, public interest within the Alliance concerning the role of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy has increased substantially. This public concern was demonstrated by the strong reaction to the proposal to deploy the Enhanced Radiation Warhead (ERW) and by the debate that surrounded NATO's decision of December 1979 to modernise its long-range theatre nuclear forces (LRTNF). A number of factors suggest that the interest and concern manifested during these episodes will continue to influence the decisions of member governments on Alliance nuclear policy. These factors include:

—A general uncertainty over the future of the SALT process and the objectives of the new American administration and concern over developments in the nuclear capabilities of both superpowers, which suggest the possibility of a less stable strategic relationship between them;

—The general deterioration in East-West relations and the consequent heightening of public awareness concerning the dangers of nuclear war;

—The implementation of the modernisation part of the NATO LRTNF decision, particularly the siting of bases and the continued postponement of a deployment decision by the Dutch and Belgian governments;

—The current and future work of the High Level Group concerning the shorter range tactical or battlefield nuclear systems, which will almost certainly lead to further proposals for modification and modernisation of the NATO TNF inventory.

—The modernisation plans of both the United Kingdom and France concerning the upgrading of their independent nuclear deterrents.

2. The cumulative effect of these factors will be to ensure that public awareness of nuclear issues remains high. It is certain that future proposals by NATO concerning the role and characteristics of nuclear weapons deployed in Europe will be the subject of serious public scrutiny and debate.

3. In view of this increased public awareness, the Assembly has created a working group comprising members of the Military and Political Committees to study the question of nuclear weapons in Europe in detail.

4. The objective of the work of this group will be to provide the basis for informed discussion and debate both within and outside the Assembly on the current and future role in Alliance strategy of nuclear weapons based in Europe, and the contribution to be made to Alliance security in this area by arms control negotiations. Particular emphasis will be placed on assessing different national perspectives

and attitudes including national party political views towards the key issues of modernisation and arms control, and the relative priorities to be accorded to either issue.

5. This objective will be achieved by examining and monitoring the work of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) and of the two groups established by NATO to coordinate policies in the key areas of modernisation and arms controls, namely, the High Level Group (HLG) and the Special Consultative Group (SCG). Sources for the report will include briefings at NATO, SHAPE and national capitals.

PART I—THE ISSUES

CHAPTER I—BACKGROUND

The Evolution of NATO's TNF Doctrine and Capabilities

6. NATO's Nuclear doctrine has evolved through a number of distinct phases. Following World War II, acute economic difficulties in Western Europe and U.S. nuclear superiority led to an almost total dependence on nuclear weapons and the adoption of the doctrine of massive retaliation. The realisation that the force goals established by the NATO Lisbon Conference in 1952 [1] as being necessary to provide a conventional defense for Europe were beyond Europe's means led to the adoption of what became known as a "tripwire" strategy, officially designated M/C–14/2. Under M/C–14/2, conventional forces would provide a defensive shield to establish the fact of agression while the United States Strategic Air Command would deliver a counter blow of massive nuclear retaliation. However, the inherent inflexibility of this strategy and its unsuitability as a response to deter lower level aggression, combined with the growth in Soviet strategic and theatre nuclear forces, gradually eroded its credibility.

7. The deployment by the Soviet Union of a long-range bomber force, though limited in size and capability, and rapid advances in missile technology, dramatically illustrated by the launching of Sputnik in 1957, changed the assumptions on which massive retaliation was based. In particular, its credibility as a strategy to protect Europe or to "extend deterrence" became doubtful. Inevitably, the question began to be asked—if the Soviet Union possessed the means to cause unacceptable damage to the United States, how realistic was it to expect the United States to use its strategic nuclear forces in the event of Soviet aggression against Europe.

8. Beginning in 1957, the United States sought to reassure Europeans of the credibility of the nuclear umbrella in two specific ways: first, by developing a wide range of strategic choices (both in terms of capabilities and doctrine) in order to give the President more than an "all or nothing" response, and secondly, by deploying nuclear systems in Europe or "offshore" that would "couple" the defense of Europe more closely to the American strategic nuclear guarantee.

9. The nuclear systems deployed in Europe are traditionally divided into 2 categories based on the weapons ranges: first, those systems capable of striking the Soviet Union and known variously as threatre, long range, medium range, "grey area" and now intermediate range systems or intermediate nuclear forces (INF); and those systems which would be used in the proximity of any conventional conflict and known variously as tactical, short range, or battlefield nuclear sys-

[1] At the Lisbon Conference, Ministers adopted force goals calling for a total of 50 divisions, and 4,000 aircraft.

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tems (BNF). These categories are somewhat artificial since certain systems, such as aircraft, obviously overlap both. Both categories were first introduced into Europe in the 1950's but for different reasons.

10. European concern over the credibility of the American guarantee increased in the late 1950's when the Soviet Union began to deploy substantial numbers of medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles—SS–4s and SS–5s—targeted on Europe. In 1957, the NATO Council decided to deploy American ballistic missiles in Europe, Thors in England and Jupiters in Italy and Turkey.[2] These systems were deployed in the spring of 1959 under dual operation and SACEUR command, but the warheads remained in U.S. custody. There were several reasons for this: to bolster American deterrent forces; to restore the diminishing confidence of European governments in the credibility of the nuclear guarantee; and to respond to military pressure, mainly from SACEUR, General Norstad, that NATO needed a nuclear missile force based in Europe capable of striking the Soviet Union. The vulnerability of these missiles, however, limited their political and military value. They were phased out in 1963 as new technologies (land- and sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles) facilitated the adoption of more distant and survivable basing strategies.

11. However, the idea that the Alliance required a European land-based force capable of striking the Soviet Union remained alive. In 1959, General Norstad advocated a force of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) in addition to the Thors and Jupiters then being placed in Europe and began to speak of the need to extend the nuclear authority of NATO. This military pressure for the deployment of a separate European-based nuclear force, in which the Europeans would have a greater say, coincided with pressure from other areas. In addition to their diminishing confidence in the American strategic commitment, some Europeans were growing increasingly resistive at their lack of participation in alliance nuclear strategy and were eager to find a formula that would remedy this situation. The Americans, for their part, were becoming concerned at the trend toward independent national deterrent forces in the United Kingdom and France.

12. The result was a variety of schemes between 1959 and 1963 for the creation of some form of NATO nuclear force. These culminated in the idea for a multilaterally owned and controlled seaborne force, the MLF. The MLF proposal was aimed at preserving American operational control over nuclear weapons while simultaneously enabling the European allies to participate in the management of a Western nuclear deterrent assigned to NATO. However, as a compromise formula trying to satisfy highly ambiguous and frequently divergent aims, its chances of success were always limited and it collapsed in 1964.

13. Following the failure of the MLF, the Alliance adopted a number of measures which, with varying degrees of success, addressed the dual problems of creating more credible coupling and of facilitating greater European participation in Alliance nuclear affairs. The Nuclear Planning Group (NPG)[3] was established to provide a forum

[2] Deployment of these systems in West Germany was considered, but was rejected by Chancellor Adenauer because it would have generated political controversy and would have had an uncertain impact on the country's relations with the East.

[3] The Nuclear Planning Group was originally composed of four permanent members, the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy and West Germany and three members rotated at 18-month intervals. Since 1979, it has been composed of all members in the Defence Planning Council, that is, all NATO members except France and Iceland.

in which Alliance members could participate and jointly exercise influence over the planning for and operational use of nuclear weapons. The American President agreed to assign 64 Polaris SLBM's directly to NATO, which, along with the British Polaris force, would be assigned to SACEUR,[4] in this sense replacing the obsolescent Thors and Jupiters. In 1967 the United States began to deploy F-111 medium range all-weather nuclear strike aircraft to the United Kingdom to be likewise responsive to SACEUR's requirements. Finally, and most significantly, in 1967 NATO adopted the strategy of flexible response.

FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

14. The adoption of the strategy of flexible response represented the culmination of a series of efforts within the Alliance to accommodate highly divergent and almost irreconcilable interests and attitudes about the role of nuclear weapons. Under this doctrine—known as MC-14/3—the Alliance signalled its determination to resist Soviet aggression at any level and its willingness to escalate the conflict to whatever degree necessary for its termination. A "ladder of escalation" options would subsequently exist from conventional to strategic forces, via the nuclear forces deployed in Europe, including both those for battlefield use and those longer range systems assigned to SACEUR.

15. Flexible response was intended to incorporate the following aims:

—to deter aggression;
—if deterrence fails, to defeat aggression at any level of attack;
—if direct defense fails, to escalate deliberately to that level required, including nuclear, for aggression to cease and for the enemy to withdraw;
—and in the event of general nuclear war, to inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union and its allies.

16. The doctrine of flexible response and the NATO Triad which supports it was defined succinctly by former Secretary James Schlesinger in 1975 as follows:

> The conventional forces of that Triad deter and defend against conventional attacks. Theatre nuclear forces deter and defend against threatre nuclear attack, help deter and, if necessary, defend against conventional attack; and help deter conflict escalation. The final leg of the Triad, strategic forces, deter and defend in general nuclear war, deter conflict escalation, and reinforce theatre nuclear forces if needed.[5]

17. The adoption of flexible response represented an uneasy compromise between differing transatlantic perspectives on the role of nuclear weapons in Alliance strategy. While considered theoretically sound, it left considerable latitude for differences over the levels of forces necessary at each stage to ensure credible deterrence. Varying Alliance roles and perspectives imposed different requirements. There was general agreement that deterrence be made as credible as possible, but disagreement over how this could be best achieved.

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[4] These arrangements were in accordance with the Nassau agreement of December 1962 under which it had been agreed that the British Polaris force would be assigned to NATO subject to withdrawal when "supreme national interest are at stake."

[5] *The Theatre Nuclear Force Posture in Europe*, a report to the United States Congress by James R. Schlesinger, Washington, D.C., April 1975.

18. As the nuclear "provider" for Alliance, the United States has been required to consider what would happen *if* deterrence failed and has had to envisage the actual use of nuclear weapons. This has led to the development of a range of options that make the threatened use of nuclear weapons believable and that provide possibilities other than the unthinkable, and therefore incredible, option of an all-out nuclear response. Credibility and usability have become inseparable elements of nuclear deterrence. Thus, developments and policies that make the threatened use of nuclear weapons more credible have the parallel effect of making their actual use appear more possible. This dilemma has encouraged a continuing debate as American strategy and capabilities have moved towards greater flexibility.

19. As the "protected," the Europeans have not always felt the same urge to look beyond deterrence to the possible use of nuclear weapons in war. They have been concerned more with absolute deterrence—the threatened use of nuclear weapons—than with what could happen if deterrence were to fail. Their major preoccupation has been to ensure the closest possible link between the defence of Europe and the American strategic nuclear deterrent. Concerned that no "gaps" should appear in the flexible response ladder, they have been equally anxious that the forces at each level should not be so strong as to encourage a nuclear war limited to European territory.

20. There is, then, an inherent tension built into the concept of deterence which is exacerbated by transatlantic differences. While NATO and American officials argue that flexible response strengthens deterrence by ensuring a continuum of capabilities which effectively "couple" Europe to the strategic guarantee, some Europeans still assert that the consequence of flexible response will be precisely the opposite—the containment of any future conflict to European territory. The fact that flexible response has not reconciled these differences has been demonstrated by the recent debates over the proposed deployment of the Enhanced Radiation Warhead (ERW) and the NATO INF modernisation decision. For many Europeans the deployment of new missiles reinforced the coupling of Europe to the United States strategic deterrent; for others it achieved the opposite effect, because in their view it gives the United States the opportunity to limit a nuclear war to Europe.

21. There is another problem: there is no definite answer to "How much is enough?," for credible deterrence depends not only on the different perspectives of guarantor and guaranteed, but also on judgments and perceptions which must be highly subjective. It is impossible to be certain what level of capability is necessary to deter the Soviet leadership. That judgment rests finally on assumptions concerning the nature of the Soviet Union, its objectives and its willingness to take risks. However, the acceptability of a strategy of deterrence does not rest only on its perceived effect on an adversary; it also depends on its effect on the people it is protecting. In this respect, the relationship between deterrence and reassurance has become the critical factor in the current debate on nuclear strategy. People must believe that the risks involved in the strategy are worth the potential gain. For many years, the risks involved in a strategy of nuclear deterrence have been conveniently ignored: today, facing the challenge of nuclear rearmament in Europe and the consequent interest in nuclear

weapons, NATO is obliged to explain and justify the ambiguities of its nuclear strategy.

BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR FORCES (BNF)

22. Although public debate has focussed primarily on long range theatre nuclear forces, increasing attention is now being directed to short range battlefield nuclear forces.

23. The NATO Council decided in 1954 to introduce tactical nuclear weapons into Europe in order to compensate for Soviet conventional superiority and to signal the intention to fight any war that might arise with tactical nuclear weapons from the very outset. Any initial advantage that was gained by this decision, however, was soon negated by Soviet acquisition of tactical nuclear weapons. In the meantime, a substantial number of warheads of various sizes designed for a wide range of delivery vehicles accumulated in Europe. The wide range of nuclear capable short range systems include: nuclear artillery, short- and medium-range rockets, aircraft, atomic-demolition mines, and anti-aircraft missiles. It is estimated that NATO has approximately 6,000 warheads on a variety of launchers (for details, see Annex I, table 1).

24. Traditionally, NATO military doctrine and planners have assigned three roles to BNF; to deter against a nuclear and conventional attack; to defend against a conventional and/or nuclear attack should conventional defence fail; and, lastly, to provide a link between conventional forces and INF. Military planners argue that the presence of battlefield nuclear weapons play a crucial role in forcing the adversary to disperse his forces, as massed armoured formations provide an ideal target for nuclear weapons. Furthermore, these weapons form an essential stage in the "escalation-ladder" and constitute an important deterrent to the use by the Warsaw Pact of their own tactical nuclear weapons or chemical weapons.

25. Although NATO's tactical nuclear weapons have not attracted much popular attention, a certain ambiguity in NATO doctrine about their potential use has been a constant source of debate in academic and other specialized circles. From the outset of their deployment in the mid-1950s, views about their use were never very clear, and NATO doctrine has remained deliberately obscure. The most general approach has been that NATO would use its tactical nuclear weapons "as soon as necessary and as late as possible," or, as one NATO official stated, "The NATO doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons is clear, concise, simple and direct. It is that when required, the Alliance would respond with nuclear weapons on the scale appropriate to the circumstances." * Strategists have consistently argued over how, when and with what consequences tactical nuclear weapons could conceivably be used. Disagreement has not been confined to outside experts. Despite the fact that discussions have been going on for years, a former member of the High Level Group recently commented that NATO has not yet managed to agree on guidelines for the follow-on use of nuclear weapons if a first attempt to communicate NATO's intentions through a controlled demonstrative use did not succeed in persuading the adversary to halt hostilities.

* Richard Shearer, Director for Nuclear Planning, NATO. Statement on the role of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy to the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly, September 1975.

26. The principal criticisms concerning the utility of NATO's battlefield nuclear weapons are as follows: many of the systems lack accuracy and the warhead yields are too large for battlefield use; most have extremely short ranges which would mean use on or near "own territory;" many systems and the warhead storage sites are vulnerable to preemptive attack. As a result of these characteristics, one of the most thoughtful critics of these systems, Senator Sam Nunn, has argued that in "the early stages of a war in Central Europe, NATO would be placed in an unacceptable position of "using or losing" its short range battlefield systems." [7]

27. Furthermore, given the awesome nature of the decision to use nuclear weapons, few experts believe that the NATO political consultation process could possibly function effectively in time of crisis.[8] In this sense the close proximity of battlefield nuclear weapons to the potential combat zone increases the urgency of the decision-making process and places an unnecessary and undesirable pressure on the Alliance political leadership. Finally, because many of the systems are dual-capable, the assignment of certain systems to a nuclear role deprives the conventional forces of much-needed conventional assets, particularly in the case of aircraft. As a result of these deficiencies, many observers have come to question the utility and the deterrent value of battlefield nuclear weapons.

28. Despite the doubts about NATO BNF doctrine and capabilities, proposals to rationalize NATO's BNF forces have always met with stiff opposition, as illustrated by the discussion of mini-nukes in the early 1970s, and more recently by the controversy over U.S. proposals to produce and deploy the ERW.[9]

29. However, political pressures have made it inevitable that the Alliance now look at the battlefield nuclear stockpile. In the general discussion on the role of nuclear weapons in Alliance strategy, interest has begun to concentrate on two aspects of NATO's tactical nuclear capabilities: first, the excessively high number of nuclear warheads and, secondly, the relationship of these weapons to the nuclear threshold. The questions now being asked are: can NATO reduce its current reliance on battlefield nuclear systems? Can it reduce the numbers of battlefield systems? If so how, that is, by unilateral action or through negotiations, and with what consequences for its strategy and specifically its conventional capabilities? Directly related to these questions is the issue of whether NATO should adopt a policy of "no first use" of nuclear weapons.

30. The present discussion of adjusting NATO's present tactical nuclear posture is the result of the convergence of a number of trends: the need to respond to growing anti-nuclear sentiment in Europe; the growing realisation that the present tactical nuclear systems are effectively unusable and therefore NATO has little to lose and much to gain, particularly in a political sense, by reducing if not eliminating them; finally, the emergence of a number of technological develop-

[7] "NATO, Can the Alliance be Saved?," Senator Sam Nunn.

[8] With regard to the political consultation process, the Athens guidelines of 1963 state that the United States will consult with it Allies on the use of tactical nuclear weapons "time and circumstance permitting." The U.S. President retains the right to use American nuclear weapons without prior consultation.

[9] Press reports have indicated that the United States intends to increase the number of ERW by developing warheads for 155 mm artillery in addition to the decision to develop warheads for 8" artillery and the Lance missile.

ments which suggest that conventional systems could now perform some missions currently filled by nuclear systems.

31. At the unofficial level, several authoritative sources have recommended in recent years that NATO consider making substantial changes in its tactical nuclear capabilities in Europe.[10] These range from the proposal for the creation of nuclear free zones to proposals for modest reductions in numbers and a concentration on long, as opposed to short, range systems.

32. Dr. Lynn Davis, a former Department of Defence official, argues that NATO should respond to public pressure by clarifying its nuclear strategy and emphasising long-range as opposed to battlefield nuclear systems. In order to effect this clarification, NATO should "announce a net reduction of approximately 2,500 warheads in the overall U.S. nuclear stockpile in Europe; a major shift in emphasis away from battlefield nuclear systems; a renewed commitment to the conventional defence of Europe through the reassignment of nuclear capable aircraft and one nuclear artillery system; the ending of one nuclear task in the Alliance, nuclear air defence; and the elimination of a number of nuclear sites in Germany." [11] According to Dr. Davis, these refinements and changes could make the deployment of new INF missiles and other necessary nuclear modernisation developments more acceptable to public opinion. However, it should be noted that in her analysis, NATO should still retain tactical nuclear capabilities, albeit reduced in numbers.

33. At the official level, the High Level Group has been examining the NATO stockpile specifically to see where 572 warheads can be withdrawn, in order to accommodate the new 572 INF systems. This reduction comes in addition to the 1,000 warheads unilaterally withdrawn in accordance with the December 1979 decision. In this context, the HLG has, primarily upon the insistence of the Dutch, begun to examine the role and utility of BNF. The HLG is currently reviewing NATO's needs for these systems and is considering serious unilateral reductions. Furthermore, the American Department of Defence has announced that it plans to retire all Nike Hercules warheads as improved conventional air defence systems are deployed and not to replace atomic demolition mines (ADMs) when they reach the end of their stockpile life.

34. Almost all of the proposals for the reduction of battlefield nuclear systems presume that such a move would require an increase in NATO's conventional capabilities. In other words, if the primary purpose of tactical nuclear weapons is to compensate for NATO's conventional weakness, any reduction in their numbers must be accompanied by a corresponding increase in NATO's conventional capabilities. But what sort of improvements would be necessary to improve NATO's conventional forces and to make conventional defence credible? General Rogers has recently stated that NATO could dispense with most of its tactical nuclear weapons if NATO governments would raise their defence spending by 4 percent instead of the agreed 3 percent a year for the rest of the 1980's. The extra spending would allow NATO to take advantage of new technology emerg-

[10] See. for example. the report by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (the Palme Commission), proposals by Johan Holst, and by Senator Sam Nunn (ibid.).

[11] "A Political Strategy for Implementing the 1979 NATO Decision on Theatre Nuclear Forces, ' Lynn Etheridge Davis, forthcoming paper.

ing in the United States. This technology will allow conventional systems to perform some missions currently assigned to nuclear weapons, notably the destruction of Warsaw Pact reinforcements of second echelon forces, following the Airland Battle 2000 Strategy.[12]

35. These suggestions would have profound implications for the Alliance and raise several questions. Will member governments endorse and support the new American concept? Would they be prepared to find extra expenditure and spend it in this fashion? Is a greater dependence on conventional forces desirable? Will such developments satisfy the concerns of antinuclear movements? Finally, is it true that an adjustment to NATO's tactical nuclear capabilities automatically means an increase in conventional forces? This is not to say that NATO does not need to improve its conventional forces; that is a permanent problem. But is there a definable relationship between the removal of tactical nuclear weapons and the provision of increased capabilities for a conventional defence? These are questions to which the Special Committee will be turning its attention in its future work.

NO FIRST-USE

36. Related to the question of the size of NATO's tactical nuclear capabilities is the question of whether NATO should change its strategy and adopt a position of no first-use of nuclear weapons. The no first-use proposal has been given prominence by a recent article written by four prominent former U.S. policy-makers who argued that NATO should move to "a new Alliance policy and doctrine: that nuclear weapons will not be used unless an aggressor uses them first."[13] The four authors state that because even the most limited use of nuclear weapons would be appalling and because of the unknowable risk of unlimited escalation, "there must be the gravest doubt about the wisdom of a policy which asserts the effectiveness of the first-use of nuclear weapons." Furthermore, they point out that the acceptance of the reliance on the concept of the early use of nuclear weapons could have produced in NATO "a dangerous gap now between real capabilities and those which political leaders might wish to have in a time of crisis."

37. The four authors acknowledge that adoption of a no first-use policy will have a number of serious consequences for NATO: most significantly it would "draw attention to the importance of maintaining and improving the specifically American conventional forces in Europe." The cost of this new emphasis would not, in their view, be excessively high; it would mean more modest requirements for Alliance nuclear forces; and it would go far to meet the understandable anxieties that underlie much of the public unease over nuclear weapons.

38. The proposal to rectify these problems is not new; Herman Kahn called for it 16 years ago and repeated it earlier this year.[14] Kahn, however, arrives at his conclusion by arguing that the first-use of nuclear weapons is immoral and unnecessary, given a realistic war-fighting capability. Fred. C. Iklé, in 1980, argued much the same as the

[12] The U.S. Army has devised a new strategy known as Airland Battle 2000 which incorporates this new technology and, if adopted, would involve a substantial change in current NATO doctrine. For a detailed discussion, see the Nunn report.
[13] Messrs. Bundy, Kennan, McNamara, and Smith. *Foreign Affairs*, Spring, 1982.
[14] See "Thinking about Nuclear Morality," *New York Times Magazine*, 13 June 1982.

four authors do now, when he called for a no first-use strategy coupled to a reinvigorated effort at increasing conventional capabilities.[15]

39. Initial reaction in official circles to the proposal by Bundy *et al* was wholly negative. Former Secretary of State Alexander Haig attempted to pre-empt the debate by denouncing the article's arguments in a speech at Georgetown University in April 1982. The adoption of a no first-use proposal by NATO would, according to him, be "tantamount to making Europe safe for conventional aggression and would require the United States to "reintroduce the draft, triple the size of its armed forces, and put its economy on wartime footing." Secretary Haig's comments were echoed by General Bernard Rogers (SACEUR) at the Madeira Session of the North Atlantic Assembly. He argued that the adoption of such a proposal would be disastrous for Alliance unity: "A no first-use policy would be viewed on both sides of the Atlantic as lessening the U.S. commitment and thereby lead to decoupling of the defence of Western Europe from the strategic nuclear forces of the United States."

40. The most comprehensive reply to the no first-use article was made by four West Germans (Karl Kaiser, George Leber, Alois Mertes and Franz Josef Schulze) in a *Foreign Affairs* article entitled, "Nuclear Weapons and the Preservation of Peace."[16] The four authors reject the no first-use proposal because in removing the uncertainty of response that currently confronts the Soviet Union, it would make war more probable. Such a declaration would constitute the effective withdrawal of the American guarantee. The Soviet Union would be able to calculate its risk and thus be able to wage war in Europe. "Such a policy would liberate the Soviet Union from the decisive nuclear risk—and thereby from using military force even for limited purposes, against Western Europe." The German authors argue that the proposers of no first-use have exaggerated the inevitability of uncontrolled escalation following the initial use of nuclear weapons, and have underestimated the political and financial difficulties that would face NATO in attempting to provide a viable conventional defence. Finally, they conclude that a no first-use declaration "would destroy the confidence of Europeans . . . in the European-American Alliance as a community of risk and would endanger the strategic unity of the Alliance and the security of Western Europe." One last objection of Kaiser *et al*, is fundamental. They argue that a "special emphasis on the renunciation of *one* form of force—the first-use of nuclear weapons—decreases the importance of the general prohibition against the use of force laid down in Article 2 of the U.N. Charter." Moreover, as they so aptly put it, "The Western Alliance has commited itself to a renunciation from the very beginning: the renunciation of the first-use of *any* force."

The Work of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG)

41. The Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) was established in 1967, following the failure of the Multilateral Force (MLF) concept, to provide a forum in which Alliance members could participate in the evolution of NATO's nuclear policy. Originally composed of four per-

[15] See "NATO: First Nuclear Use: A Deepening Trap?," *Strategic Review*, Vol. 8, No. 1.
[16] Summer, 1982.

manent members (the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy) and three members rotated at 16-month intervals, since 1979 it has comprised all Alliance members in the Defence Training Committee (i.e. all members except France and Iceland).

42. The NPG was initially concerned with the theory and doctrine of tactical nuclear weapons and concentrated on developing provisional political guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons. A series of analytical studies was made examining the circumstances under which nuclear weapons could be used, the criteria ministers would take into account in their consultations concerning such use, and the results of theatre nuclear weapon (TNW) use. By the mid-1970's, the NPG moved to procurement considerations as system replacement became necessary.

Soviet Capabilities

43. The Soviet Union first deployed long-range nuclear-capable bombers in the mid-1950's. The 1981 Department of Defense (DOD) Report notes that the Soviet long-range aviation force now consists of 450 Badger and Blinder types and about 65–70 of the more modern Backfire (first deployed in 1974).

44. The Soviet Union first deployed medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (MRBM and IRBM) SS–4s and SS–5s in the late 1950's, eventually deploying approximately 700. In 1977, they began to modernize this force, through the deployment of the mobile Mirv'd SS–20. The SS–20 is considerably more capable than the SS–4s and SS–5s, some of which it has replaced. According to United States sources, the SS–20 is a mobile system, contrasted with the silo-based SS–4 and SS–5, significantly enhancing its survivability. It has a greater range (over 4,000 kms) than either the SS–4 or SS–5. It has significantly greater accuracy, reported as 440 feet over a 2,500-mile range. The SS–20 has three warheads per missile, the SS–4 and SS–5 have one. The SS–20 has a reload capability, further enhancing Soviet TNF warfighting capability.

45. The Soviet Union has insisted that deployment of the SS–20 represents a normal stage in the modernisation of its nuclear forces, and that the SS–20 is intended for carrying out the same tasks as the medium-range missiles of older types which it now replaces.

46. Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, announced that the Soviet Union had completed another SS–20 base in the Western part of the Soviet Union, bringing the total number of SS–20s deployed to 324. This was in addition to two bases whose construction Burt had revealed on 1 July. The work on a further three sites is expected to be completed by the end of 1982, bringing the total number of SS–20s deployed to 342. These are in direct contradiction to the 16 March announcement by President Brezhnev of a freeze on the deployment of SS–20s west of the Urals, and a further statement by Brezhnev on 18 May indicating the moratorium applied also to the preparations for deployments of missiles. However, the precise meaning of Brezhnev's statement regarding new sites remains somewhat confused since, according to a report in the Washington Times of 1 July 1982, "a senior U.S. official, who declined to be identified, admitted that Washington had no information on construction being started on new sites since Brezhnev's statements."

CHAPTER II—THE MODERNISATION OF NATO'S NUCLEAR FORCES

47. In May 1977, as part of its Long-Term Defense Programme, NATO established Task Force 10 to examine the deficiencies in NATO's TNF position. The NPG was given responsibility for Task Force 10. At its October 1977 meeting in Bari, Italy, the NPG established the High Level Group (HLG) as a subordinate body directed to examine NATO's TNF and the need for modernisation. The HLG was made up of officials from national capitals of all countries except France, Iceland, Luxembourg and Portugal and was chaired by the United States.

48. On 12 December 1979, NATO ministers [17] agreed to modernise NATO's LRTNF through the deployment of 572 single warhead nuclear missiles in five European countries: 108 Pershing II missiles and 96 GLCMs in the Federal Republic, 160 GLCMs in the United Kingdom, 112 in Italy, 48 in both Belgium and the Netherlands. All systems will be deployed with American forces only and will be under American command and control. The cost of development and production of these systems will be paid for by the United States; the NATO Allies will contribute to the infrastructure and support of the systems through their contribution to the NATO Infrastructure Fund.

49. At the same time, NATO expressed its willingness to negotiate limits on its deployment in exchange for reciprocal Soviet limitations, particularly on the land-based missile component of their LRTNF.

The Rationale for LRTNF Modernisation

50. Since the beginning of the Alliance, the willingness and capacity of the United States to use its nuclear forces in the defence of Europe has been a traditional preoccupation within NATO. Part of this debate has concerned the argument that the credibility of the American guarantee is strengthened by the basing in Europe of nuclear forces capable of striking the Soviet Union. Nuclear missiles were stationed in Europe in the early 1960's and nuclear-capable aircraft (F–111s) with a nuclear strike mission against the Soviet Union are currently stationed in the United Kingdom. In doctrinal terms, the credibility of Alliance nuclear strategy was enhanced by the adoption of the doctrine of flexible response in 1967. The adoption of this strategy ended the doubts that had dominated Alliance discussions in the 1960s. However, in the mid-1970's, public attention was again drawn to the adequacy of Alliance nuclear strategy through a speech by Chancellor Schmidt.

51. Speaking to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in October 1977, Chancellor Schmidt made several general observations concerning Alliance security and trends in the strategic nuclear balance. In this speech, the Chancellor argued that strategic parity, as codified by SALT, "neutralised" the strategic nuclear capabilities of the two superpowers, and that this development magnified the disparities between East and West in tactical nuclear and conven-

[17] See NATO Communiqué in annex. Despite the official consensus for the decision, Belgium and the Netherlands reserved their positions concerning deployment (Belgium initially for six months, the Netherlands until December 1981 pending progress in arms control negotiations).

tional weapons. In his view, a SALT process confined to the superpowers would impair the security of Western Europe unless the disparities of power in Europe were removed parallel to the SALT negotiations. Behind these remarks lay the concern that SALT II excluded Soviet systems aimed at Europe (the SS–20 and Backfire) but included American systems that could be of help to Europe (cruise missiles). At the time of the Chancellor's speech, the precise details of the emerging SALT II Treaty (following the rejection by the Soviet Union of President Carter's "heavy cuts" proposal of March 1977) were not known. However, European officials were concerned that the new treaty would include restrictions on cruise missiles that would effectively deny their utilisation in Europe. However, the speech did not make clear how the disparities to which the Chancellor referred were to be removed. He commented that if they remained, then the Alliance "must maintain the full balance of deterrence strategy ... and must therefore be ready to make available the means to support its current strategy." But referring to the Vienna MBFR negotiations, he said that there were two ways of establishing a conventional balance with the Warsaw Pact—for NATO to undertake a build-up or for NATO and the Warsaw Pact to reduce their force strength and achieve an overall balance at a lower level. The Chancellor stated that he preferred the latter approach.

52. The Chancellor's speech gave political momentum to a process that was already underway. NATO had already decided to review its TNF and had established the HLG for that purpose. During its first meeting, the HLG decided—at the urgings of the European representatives—that the long-range component of NATO TNF needed attention. They agreed fairly rapidly that new deployments would be necessary and the United States was asked to provide "hardware" options. By early 1979, a consensus was obtained on the need for a mix of Pershing ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles. The precise number of 572 systems was decided in the summer of 1979.

53. Alliance officials present the rationale for LRTNF modernisation as resulting from the coincidence of three separate but related developments: strategic parity, existing NATO LRTNF obsolescence and Soviet LRTNF modernisation. It is argued that the development of strategic parity as codified by the SALT process has raised questions concerning the credibility of the American strategic nuclear forces to defend Europe. The credibility of the American nuclear deterrent vis-à-vis Europe has been further diminished by the declining effectiveness of existing NATO long-range nuclear assets in Europe, notably American F–111 and British Vulcan aircraft, whose penetration capability has been put in doubt by improvements to Soviet air defences and by their own obsolescence. It is also argued that because the 400 Poseidon warheads allocated to NATO are part of America's strategic forces, they are not sufficiently identified with, or linked to, the defence of Europe. Neither do their characteristics facilitate their use for the selective response that NATO strategy requires. These deficiencies in NATO's forces contrast with the very substantial improvements in Soviet LRTNF capabilities targeted on Europe, notably the introduction of the SS–20 and the Backfire bomber.

54. As a result of these related developments, Alliance officials argue that NATO's strategy of flexible response has become deficient. A gap

has become evident in the area of long-range theatre nuclear systems which the Soviet Union could exploit. During a crisis, Soviet LRTNF capabilities could provide the Soviet Union with the means to escalate to a level at which NATO has no credible response, because both NATO's existing LRTNF and the threat of American strategic retaliation lack credibility.

55. The HLG's deliberations initially concerned the deficiencies of NATO's own capabilities. However, in the public discussion, attention increasingly focussed on the SS–20. A number of observers argue that the SS–20 poses a qualitatively different threat to Europe in the sense that it can threaten European military targets with greater accuracy and reduced collateral damage. It affords the Soviet Union more selective and thus more credible options against Europe. Moreover, because of its mobility, it is no longer targetable by American strategic systems as were the fixed silo SS–4s and SS–5s. Accordingly, the SS–20 gives the Soviet Union the potential to initiate nuclear strikes against NATO's nuclear and military forces which it previously lacked. The SS–20 constitutes a military threat which could be used in a time of crisis for political intimidation. However, other observers have disputed that the SS–20 alters the military balance in any practical way. They point out that because of the size of the warhead (150 KT), a selective strike against Europe would cause appalling damage, no matter what the accuracy, and inevitably initiate a more general nuclear conflict. Under these conditions, it is difficult to understand how this new capability would give the Soviet Union a usable weapon, either in a military or political sense.

56. The public debate emphasised the SS–20 to the exclusion of other arguments and weapons systems. The over-emphasis on the SS–20 was perhaps inevitable because it is easier to discuss publicly the need for LRTNF modernisation by pointing to visible Soviet capabilities than by explaining somewhat esoteric NATO doctrine. However, while understandable, this emphasis has contributed to some of the current ambiguity concerning the precise objectives of the NATO decision.

57. While the reasons advanced to justify the need for LRTNF modernisation involved military criteria, the evolution of the NATO decision was also influenced heavily by political considerations, notably that deployments should be land-based and visible to ensure coupling between the United States and Europe [18]; that the numbers should be high enough to ensure the credibility of flexible response, but not so high as to suggest a self-contained theatre nuclear capability; that the Federal Republic should not be the only non-nuclear continental member to accept deployments [19]; and that a deployment proposal must be accompanied by an offer to begin arms control negotiations. The NATO 12 December double-track decision represented an attempt to accommodate the requirements of NATO's policy of defence and détente. This attempt to balance military and political considerations pervades the entire LRTNF debate, particularly concerning the role of arms control and the relative priority to be accorded to modernisation and arms control.

[18] There were also technical and military reasons for preferring land-based deployments, but the political coupling argument predominated. (See paragraphs 72–76 for discussion of the sea-based options.)

[19] The Federal Republic established a number of criteria for its participation, notably, the non-singularity principle.

58. In his speech to the IISS, Chancellor Schmidt referred to modernisation and arms control as alternative methods for removing the disparities of power. In the evolution of the LRTNF decision, NATO adopted both approaches as parallel and complementary. The NATO Communiqué states that:

> A modernisation decision including commitments to deployments is necessary to meet NATO's deterrence and defence needs, to provide a credible response to unilateral Soviet deployments and to provide the foundation for the pursuit of serious negotiations on TNF . . . NATO's TNF requirements will be examined in the light of concrete results reached through negotiations.

The double track decision therefore links the two approaches together; modernisation provides the foundation for arms control, but arms control can modify the magnitude of modernisation.

59. While theoretically clear, the precise relationship between arms control and modernisation remains ambiguous and consequently uncertainties exist concerning the precise objectives of the NATO decision. To be precise, what degree of modernisation is necessary and to what extent should this be influenced by SS–20 deployments? This uncertainty reflects different perceptions of the cause of the problem and hence its solution. Put simply, if the main cause of the gap is a deficiency in NATO's own capabilities, then modernisation is necessary irrespective of Soviet developments, but if the principal cause is SS–20 deployments, then in theory, arms control could provide the solution through reductions. Because of differences concerning the perceived cause of the problem, variations exist in national capitals concerning the appropriate emphasis to be placed on the respective components of the dual decision.

60. During meetings with the Special Committee in Bonn in 1981, German officials tended to stress the need for LRTNF as a response to the SS–20. In the words of one official:

> If it is true that the NATO decision was a reaction to the Soviet build-up, then if that build-up were to disappear, you would not need to follow through.

German officials stressed the importance of making Soviet modernisation the prime reason for the NATO decision:

> It is important to make it known to the Russians that they are the source of the problem that we have and we would not need a two-track decision had it not been for their build-up.

If the Soviet Union had no LRTNF, then there would be no need for Allies LRTNF:

> If we achieved zero SS–20, zero SS–4 and zero SS–5, existing NATO forces, carrier-based aircraft, for instance, would be sufficient again. We could live with zero deployments under these conditions.

The officials acknowledged that this would leave the problem of improved Soviet air defences, but said this problem could be solved by modernising existing aircraft.

61. British officials, on the other hand, emphasised the need for modernisation as a function of the deficiencies of flexible response. NATO doctrine requires the capability to strike the Soviet Union with systems based in Europe. Existing capabilities, all based in the United Kingdom, were aging and were in need of replacement. Modernisation was

required irrespective of developments in Soviet capabilities. The SS–20 was not essential to this argument though its deployment made the case stronger.

62. American officials stressed the doctrinal requirement for LRTNF, but the views of some officials indicated a more demanding role for LRTNF than the one required by their European counterparts. These officials argue that NATO should have TNF capabilities for a wider range of contingencies than that of a selective response. In their opinion, LRTNF are military assets which must have a demonstrative military use to be credible. They believe that LRTNF constitute war-fighting capabilities rather than political signalling assets as many Europeans tend to perceive them.

63. Some American officials also emphasised the relationship of LRTNF to the SS–20, but for rather different reasons. They stressed that the extent and rate of SS–20 deployments was well beyond the original projections made in 1979. For this reason, a new threat assessment was being carried out. The implication was that NATO could possibly do with more than 572, but certainly no less.[20]

64. At the official level, these variations are of interest mainly for the light they throw on the different perceptions of the need for LRTNF modernisation and on the objectives of the NATO decision. They do not reflect any divergence from the general principles of the dual-track decision, but they could eventually lead to differences over the precise number of LRTNF NATO actually requires in the light of Soviet deployments and arms control negotiations.

65. At the public level, the ambiguity of the precise objectives of the NATO decision has led to a degree of misunderstanding. The integral relationship between modernisation and arms control has not been clearly understood. In some countries, the emphasis on arms control may have created the impression that negotiations can solve the problem of deployments.[21]

The Choice of 572

66. Because a convincing explanation had never been publicised concerning how the Alliance arrived at the number 572, it was a matter of some concern for the Special Committee. While it is difficult to justify any precise figure, the number was not as arbitrary as some have suggested. In their deliberations, the High Level Group considered a range of options and decided that 200–600 offered the most appropriate possibilities.

According to officials, the precise number of 572 was derived from a series of military-political requirements including the following considerations:

—The new systems were chosen to enhance deterrence by providing NATO with the capability to respond to a nuclear attack short of a general strategic exchange, and by replacing the aging systems—F–111s and Vulcans—which currently fulfill these requirements.

—To meet the requirements for deterrence and for flexible response, there had to be a sufficient number of systems capable of surviving a possible pre-emptive attack, particularly in view of improving Soviet capabilities.

[20] For further discussion see pages 17–19 on the choice of 572.
[21] For further discussion see pages 26–29 on the "zero option."

—For the same reason, the number had to be large enough to penetrate Soviet air defences.

—There had to be a wide geographical spread of the systems, that is, the systems had to be spread from north to south throughout the countries of the Alliance to complicate Soviet military planning. An equally important consideration was the concept of sharing the nuclear risk among Alliance members.

—The number had to be large enough to constitute a political response by NATO. This would also encourage the Soviet Union to enter seriously into arms control negotiations.

—The number was large enough to provide a margin for reductions through arms control negotiations.

—However, the number could not be too large, or it would appear to constitute a separate theatre nuclear capability.

—The size of the Soviet modernisation programme also implied the need for a high number on the 200–600 scale. However, it was emphatically stressed that the number 572 was not considered as countering the SS–20 weapon for weapon.

—Concerning the mix of the two systems, their characteristics offer flexibility to NATO and maximise the difficulties for Soviet planners. It was a political-military decision that Pershing II would be as similar as possible to Pershing IAs and will only be installed where Pershing IAs [22] are currently deployed. Pershing II is thus considered a replacement and modernisation. At present, the Soviet Union has no effective defence against the cruise missiles, and while the Soviets could feasibly build an adequate air defence in the future, American officials estimate it would cost in the range of $50 billion.

However, differences exist concerning the precise number of LRTNF NATO required to satisfy flexible response. German officials noted that on at least two counts, the number could have been smaller; firstly, as replacements for existing systems fewer than 572 would have accomplished the presently assigned tasks; secondly, NATO's requirement of deliberate escalation would not require as many as 572. According to one German official:

> I can envisage no situation to release 572 warheads of this type and call this act a deliberate and selective escalation. For my understanding, for deliberate escalation we can live with a much smaller number than 572.

67. By way of contrast, a number of American officials see the number of 572 as a base rather than a ceiling. Their views rest on the assumption that NATO needs credible theatre nuclear capabilities and that requirements should be decided on military rather than political grounds. This position was articulated by Congressman Whitehurst during a presentation to the Military Committee in Venice in May 1981. Congressman Whitehurst commented that it was clear that no allowance for actual theatre exchange and resultant system casualties entered into the LRTNF calculations. He argued that the quantity of 572 is insufficient to accept pre-launch attrition and still carry out counter-force missions. The militarily appropriate quantities are two or three times higher than the 572 agreed to by the ministers. The ap-

[22] Only the Pershing IAs with American forces will be replaced by the extended range Pershing II. The shorter range Pershing IA with German forces (under dual key) will remain. A short-range Pershing II is under development.

propriate number of GLCMs and Pershing IIs can really be determined only by an operational warfighting rationale and doctrine that NATO lacks.

68. As a result of the accelerated pace of Soviet SS-20 deployment the HLG was mandated at the Rome Ministerial Meeting in May 1981 to produce two studies, a new threat assessment of LRTNF and NATO's LRTNF functional requirements. At the time, these studies raised the question whether this would mean a revaluation of the number 572. However, this possibility was subsequently ruled out by American and European officials alike.

The Current Status of Implementation

69. Of the countries selected for deployment, the Netherlands and Belgium reserved their decision pending progress in arms control negotiations. Both have basically maintained this position. United Kingdom officials have said that preparations are well under way at the prospective bases of Molesworth and Greenham Common. Italy has announced that Comiso in Sicily will be its cruise missile base. The sites in the Federal Republic of Germany have yet to be announced.

70. Officials were unwilling to speculate on whether a redistribution of quotas would be possible in the event that one or more of the selected countries refused deployment. German officials drew attention to their condition of non-singularity. They stated that a negative decision by either the Netherlands or Belgium would undoubtedly influence the public debate in Germany, and that a change of position by Italy would necessitate a reassessment of the decision.

71. Statements by a variety of U.S. Department of Defence officials have acknowledged that the Pershing II programme has a number of problems. Its estimated cost has gone from $1.8 billion in September 1981 to $2.8 billion in December 1981. The Pershing II failed on its first flight test in Spring 1982, a failure which may cause a further 5-month delay. However, Army officials have maintained that despite this delay, neither production nor the planned deployment of the missiles to West Germany in late 1983 or early 1984 will be postponed. Two GAO reports released in February 1982 criticised the development of cruise missiles. The reports stated that tests had shown the cruise missile to be deficient in reliability, effectiveness and suitability for its missions. The criticism was applied to both the Boeing air-launched cruise missile and the General Dynamics Tomahawk sea and ground-launched cruise missile.

The Sea-Based Option

72. Increasing public opposition to the deployment of land-based missiles has led to a resurgence of interest in the possibility of deploying new systems at sea. The Special Committee learned that at the time the NATO long-range TNF modernisation decision was under consideration, the High Level Group gave serious thought to the so-called sea-basing option, that is, modernisation through the use of a sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM), rather than ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM). According to German officials, Chancellor Schmidt pressed the HLG to study the possibility of sea-basing as a

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means of increasing participation. The sea-based option was analysed as part of a possible LRTNF package and was rejected for several reasons. The HLG concluded that there were military and political advantages to the GLCM unavailable in the SLCM.

73. The most prominent reason for preferring land to sea-basing combined both military and political factors: it was the perception that the deterrent effect of land-based missiles is higher. Missiles based on European territory are physically and unambiguously identified with European defence. They "couple" Europe and the United States in an unmistakable fashion. A Soviet leader would be left in no doubt that a nuclear attack on Europe would be met by a nuclear response by the Alliance. Soviet territory would not be a sanctuary.

74. Among the other arguments against the SLCM were the following:

—It did not satisfy NATO's military requirements as effectively as land-based. Land-based missiles would permit deliberate escalation and selective use, sea-based missiles would not facilitate the same flexibility nor responsiveness.

—Sea-basing would have raised problems of command and control and a range of problems concerning participation. With GLCMs, the battery commander is obviously only an American, but with the SLCM, the situation would be more complex. If the force were United States ships only, they would be seen as an extension of American strategic forces. If they were Allied ships with a United States control unit, problems similar to those that faced the Alliance during the Multilateral Force (MLF) decision in the 1960's and were unresolved, would re-emerge.

—Deployment of missiles on existing platforms would have led to operational complications. Moreover, the primary roles of the ships and submarines in Alliance navies would be changed and diminished with the introduction of the SLCM, creating new problems for the Western navies. On the other hand, the building of new dedicated platforms would have increased the cost of the modernisation programme.

—Range deficiencies would have prohibited the deployment of Pershings at sea, which, under the selected mix of systems, would have left the Federal Republic in a singular position—the only country to have land-based missiles.

—Sea-basing would have also caused political problems in the sense that missile-carrying ships could be the cause of political protest. This would be an enduring problem compared with the issue of land-basing. It was argued that opposition to land-basing would dissipate once the missiles had been deployed.

—Sea-basing was perceived by some officials as a way of avoiding risk-sharing, whereas land-based systems clearly involved risk-sharing.

—Sea-basing would have greatly complicated arms control negotiations.

75. The Special Committee was informed that there was no Alliance support for the sea-based option. Opposition to a re-examination of the SLCM remains based on the political and military disadvantages. But it is reinforced by the determination to maintain the cohesion of the NATO decision. Even those who were originally sceptical of the

LRTNF modernisation decision and would have certainly preferred sea-basing are now opposed to a revival of the concept because of its damaging implications for the dual-track decision. For these people, the principal objective is to secure arms control negotiations, and they believe that the best prospects for negotiations lie in adhering to the dual-track decision. In this respect, it is felt that opponents of the NATO decision are now arguing the case for sea-based systems because they realise that any deviation from the present position would undermine the 12 December decision.

76. The United States is planning a substantial expansion of its cruise missile programme. Press reports note that the Navy plans to deploy between 3,000 and 4,000 anti-ship and land attack cruise missiles with ranges of between 700 and 1,100 miles on surface ships and submarines. A 1983 date has been set for initial deployment. So far, only conventional warheads are planned but a nuclear warhead version is under consideration.

The Current Work of the High Level Group (HLG)

77. The HLG is now reviewing other aspects of NATO's TNF. In particular, it is examining the precise nature, scope and basis of the adjustments required by LRTNF deployments, as well as the possible implications for the balance of roles and systems in NATO's nuclear armoury as a whole. Since it was agreed that modernisation should not produce any change in the overall total of nuclear weapons in Europe, 572 warheads will have to be withdrawn from NATO's inventory to accommodate the new LRTNF. This is in addition to the 1,000 warheads unilaterally withdrawn as part of the 12 December decision. The HLG is therefore examining on a step-by-step basis the nuclear systems currently deployed in Europe to see which ones could be removed. This process appears to correspond to the so-called "shift study." A number of European countries, in particular the Netherlands, proposed that NATO should use the issue of LRTNF deployments to initiate a shift in its nuclear weaponry away from the present concentration on short-range systems. Questioned by the Special Committee on this concept, American officials were reluctant to use the term "shift" as it prejudged the conclusion of any study. In the words of one official, the answer could be "no shift" or "more of the same." With regard to the battlefield element in NATO's TNF, American officials stressed the comprehensive nature of Soviet TNF modernisation. They pointed out that the Soviet Union was already deploying substantially improved short-range systems without any parallel response from NATO.

78. In meetings with officials and members of parliament, the need for a review of NATO's requirements for tactical and battlefield nuclear weapon systems was frequently stressed. It was thought that NATO could very probably maintain deterrence even with the removal of some of these systems. The HLG is currently studying ways of rationalising and reducing NATO's BNF stockpile in Europe.

American Nuclear Policy

79. The change of American leadership in Washington has had a number of implications for the modernisation programme and for fu-

ture nuclear planning within the Alliance, particularly American strategic plans and the administration's view of Alliance nuclear planning.[23]

80. President Reagan has determined that America's military forces must be considerably strengthened in order to reverse what is perceived as a decline in American power relative to the Soviet Union. His plans include substantial improvements to America's strategic forces. Two elements of these plans have given rise to comment in Europe and in the United States—the potential development and deployment of the MX missiles and the planned deployment of large numbers of cruise missiles at sea.

81. Plans to develop and deploy the MX mobile missile encountered very substantial opposition from residents in the prospective basing states of Utah and Nevada. As a result, the Secretary of Defence authorised a major review of the options available to the United States to solve the problem of land-based vulnerability.

82. American plans to deploy large numbers of cruise missiles on surface ships and submarines has also had consequences in Europe. It has refocussed attention on sea-basing as a possible option for NATO, and it has led to the observation that the tremendous expansion of cruise missiles makes NATO's 572 warheads somewhat insignificant and perhaps redundant.

Nuclear Planning

83. Before the formation of the HLG, the United States had traditionally played a dominant role in the Nuclear Planning Group in the evolution of Alliance nuclear policy. The United States initiated and directed procurement policy while keeping the Allies informed and consulting on deployment through the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). However, the formation of the HLG facilitated a more prominent role for the Europeans. They contributed to the evolution of the rationale for LRTNF and to the characteristics of the procurement decision itself. This degree of participation inevitably entailed taking account of European sensibilities on a number of issues—German non-singularity, the emphasis on arms control etc.

84. During the Special Committee's visit to Washington in May 1981, Reagan administration officials indicated that they felt the Carter administration had gone too far in abdicating American leadership in Alliance nuclear policy. In their view, European sensibilities had been accommodated to an excessive extent with the result that a necessary modernisation decision had been made conditional on arms control negotiations, the objectives of which had not been thought through. The view was expressed by some officials that under this administration, the United States would reassert its position vis-à-vis nuclear policy for the Alliance. Nuclear procurement decisions would be treated as matters of unilateral American concern, while consultation with the Allies would naturally take place concerning deployment. This policy appears to have been followed in the decision concerning production of the Enhanced Radiation Warhead (ERW). However, this approach creates an artificial distinction that could undermine the principle of Alliance consultation on policies of immediate relevance to the security of Western Europe.

[23] The most significant consequence of the change in Administration—the policy towards arms control negotiations—is discussed in the section on the Special Consultative Group.

CHAPTER III—ARMS CONTROL

85. In the autumn of 1978, several governments expressed concern that NATO was concentrating on a "hardware" solution to the LRTNF problem and ignoring arms control considerations, without public support for modernisation would be difficult to obtain. Accordingly, in April 1979, NATO established a Special Group (SG) to examine the arms control implications of an LRTNF decision in parallel with the work of the HLG. The SG, like the HLG, was staffed from national capitals and chaired by the United States.

86. The SG established a number of guidelines, the most important being these: the work of the HLG constituted the basic point of reference for the SG; arms control negotiations would be neither realistic nor possible without an agreed modernisation plan and a decision to implement it; LRTNF negotiations should be conducted within a SALT III framework; and the negotiations should ensure de jure equality in ceilings and in rights.

87. By the autumn of 1979, the SG had established a general negotiating framework. The central feature of this position was that negotiations should focus on the Soviet land-based missile force as the most immediate threat and attempt to reduce this force by limiting SS-20 deployment and ensuring the retirement of the SS-4s and SS-5s.

88. The NATO 12 December decision combined an agreement to modernise with the recommendations that arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union should begin as soon as possible. However, a variety of factors (the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the shelving of SALT II, and the hostile Soviet reaction to the NATO decision) prevented any progress being made in the arms control field. A speech by President Brezhnev on 6 October, 1979 had contained an offer to negotiate on LRTNF on condition NATO did not take its decision to modernise. NATO rejected this as a propaganda effort to halt the modernisation decision and ensure division within the Alliance. Soviet officials then stated that the 12 December decision had cancelled the basis for negotiation and for six months the Soviet Union refused the possibility of negotiations. Following Chancellor Schmidt's visit to Moscow in June 1980, the Soviet Union dropped their precondition that NATO rescind its 12 December decision, and, despite the non-ratification of SALT II, agreed that preliminary discussions on limiting medium-range systems could begin. However, the Soviets took the position that American forward-based systems (FBS) should be included in the negotiations and stated that no agreement or treaty could be implemented before the ratification of SALT II.

89. The first round of these preliminary discussions on LRTNF negotiations was held in Geneva in October 1980, but was terminated because of the American elections.

90. President Brezhnev made a further initiative with his proposal of a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range missiles, a suggestion rejected by NATO defence ministers because it would not address the fundamental problems caused by the momentous build-up of Soviet arms, particularly LRTNF.

91. For a substantial period, considerable uncertainty existed concerning the attitude of the Reagan administration toward the arms

control component of the double-track decision. However, during the May 1981 meeting of the NATO foreign ministers in Rome, Secretary Haig announced that the United States would commence LRTNF negotiations with the Soviet Union before the end of the year. This announcement and certain other actions by the administration, such as endorsement of the Conference on European Disarmament as part of the CSCE process, went some way to allay European anxieties concerning the American commitment to LRTNF negotiations.

92. European officials welcomed the American statement on commencing LRTNF negotiations. But they expressed some disquiet at the prevailing sentiment in Washington during the early Reagan administration on the utility of arms control. Commenting on the disenchantment with arms control in the United States, one German official said:

> This development has not taken place in Europe because in Europe we have never regarded arms control as an alternative to deterrence. Our less Quixotic view of arms control has enabled us to maintain continuity in that view. It is in our interest to continue arms control as a realistic and practical process.

Similarly, a British official commented that arms control should not be a search for unilateral advantage but for greater stability. A framework for stability is essential for the competitive situation in which we live.

93. European officials generally agreed that too close a linkage between arms control efforts and Soviet international behaviour was unproductive and unwise, and were thus hesitant about the approach of the Reagan administration in this regard. The European view is generally that arms control negotiations and treaties must serve security. They are not a substitute for defence, but an integral part of security. For these reasons, as one United Kingdom official said, they should not be considered "the donkey to carry the full burden of East-West relations." At the same time, it is widely recognised that an extreme action by either party, for instance, Soviet intervention in Poland, would have an immediate impact on any negotiations. Such extreme actions, however, should be distinguished from other international behaviour, according to most European officials. As an essential component of security, arms control efforts leave little room for rewarding the good and punishing the bad.

94. European observers and officials alike expressed the almost unanimous view that the non-ratification of SALT II had had a profound effect on public opinion in Europe. It had been a major factor in the growth of opposition to the NATO decision and the rise of the anti-nuclear movements. European public opinion had found it difficult to understand that a treaty that had been evolved under four administrations could suddenly be dismissed as fatally flawed and contrary to the interests of the Alliance. American interest and willingness to negotiate arms control is considered essential to Alliance security and specifically to the implementation of the NATO LRTNF decision.

95. The NATO framework for LRTNF negotiations remains the one originally agreed by the Special Group. Co-ordination continues to be managed through this group, now known as the Special Consultative Group (SCG), and chaired by Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Burt.

96. Administration officials have emphasised that in proceeding with LRTNF negotiations, they will seek the closest possible solution with their Allies. A senior American official told the Special Committee that "these negotiations intimately affect you and we need to hear your views . . . we will not enter into negotiations without hearing what you think." Noting that in the final analysis LRTNF negotiations are a United States/Soviet Union bilateral affair and that, therefore, there may be Allied points of view the United States cannot accept, he nevertheless added "my instructions are to take them into account."

97. While the preliminary discussions in Geneva in October 1980 were short-lived, they permitted American negotiators to learn some details of the Soviet approach. The Soviet negotiators had initially adopted a very general approach which became more specific as the talks progressed. The Soviet position was that when all principal nuclear arms in Europe were taken into account, a general balance existed. They mentioned a broad range of NATO's nuclear capabilities as being relevant to the general balance. Their objective appeared to be to freeze this balance at existing levels. Their negotiating position was based on a "freedom of mix" and they proposed launchers as the unit of account. Alliance officials have expressed opposition to any attempt to broaden the scope of the negotiations since this would unnecessarily complicate them and make immediate progress unlikely.

98. The main discrepancy the Special Committee encountered during meetings with officials in 1981 concerned the objectives of the arms control approach and the so-called "zero option." The "zero option" refers to the theoretical, but admittedly highly unlikely possibility, that the Soviet Union would reduce all its long-range land-based missile forces. In this case, a number of German officials stated that NATO would not need to modernise—an argument which runs counter to the rationale that NATO needs new LRTNF deployments irrespective of Soviet developments. However, the objective of recognising the "zero option" as a desirable but implausible goal is to place the responsibility for NATO modernisation on the Soviet Union. NATO is saying that it will establish parity as low as the Soviet Union wishes, even to zero. As a German official stated: "Zero growth is only a theoretical goal. But parity can be achieved as far down as the Soviets will permit."

99. A British official summed up the dilemma that the "zero option" represents by commenting that because the number of NATO deployments are not a function of Soviet capabilities, the "zero option" is a nonstarter. However, he added that in the unlikely event that the Soviet Union was prepared to get rid of all its SS-20s, then NATO would be in a different position. In that case, "For political reasons, we could go for a zero option, but on political grounds, not strategic doctrine."

100. The "zero option" illustrates two problems inherent in linking arms control to modernisation: firstly, many observers believe it is a mistake to make NATO deployments dependent on Soviet actions; secondly, the notion of the "zero option" raises public expectations that arms control can provide a solution and obviate the need for deployments.

The Geneva Negotiations on Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF)

*101. The negotiating approach adopted by the Reagan administration for the INF negotiations in Geneva has followed the framework established by the Special Group under the Carter Administration and put forward during the preliminary discussions held in Geneva in October 1980. The essentials of this position were: that the negotiations should adopt a step-by-step approach focussing first on the most threatening element of Soviet INF, namely the land-based missile component (SS–20s, SS–4s and SS–5s); the object would be global limitations with a European regional subceiling; the counting would be warheads on launchers; and aircraft would be considered at a later stage.

*102. However, the proposals submitted by the Reagan administration in the form of a draft treaty differ in several important respects:

—the proposal, as announced by President Reagan in November, that the Alliance objective will be the zero option, that is that all Soviet SS–20s, SS–4s and SS–5s be dismantled in return for no deployment by NATO of Pershing II or ground-launched cruise missiles;

—the ceilings will be global; the idea of European regional subceilings has been discarded;

—counting will focus on warheads on missiles in order to account for reload missiles;

—there is provision for the inclusion of a shorter range missiles in order to ensure that an agreement on longer range missiles cannot be circumvented through deployment of shorter range missiles, namely, the U.S. INF Treaty includes restraints on SS–12/22s and SS–23s that freeze them at current levels;

—more exacting, as yet undefined, verification procedures are sought.

THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE

*103. The Soviet approach to the INF talks reflects their long-held view that when all principal nuclear weapons in the European theatre are taken into account, an overall balance exists. Consistent with President Brezhnev's precondition that American forward-based systems (FBS) be taken into account, Soviet negotiators at the October 1980 Geneva talks proposed that all medium-range carriers be included; that the counting formula should be launchers; and that either side should have the freedom to mix. Concerning the geographic scope, Soviet statements have been careful to refer only to the European part of the Soviet Union.

*104. President Brezhnev has made several calls for a moratorium on the deployment of all new missiles in Europe. This proposal was reinforced by an offer to reduce unilaterally a substantial number of Soviet medium-range carriers during the course of the negotiations as a gesture of good will. This has not yet occurred.

*105. As a result of Western criticism of these proposals, Brezhnev has further clarified the Soviet position. He has stated that not only has the Soviet Union discontinued deployments of medium-range missiles in the Western part of the Soviet Union, but it is actually already reducing such weapons by a considerable number. Concerning Western doubts over Soviet good faith in declaring a moratorium on SS–20 deployment, Brezhnev asserted that the unilateral freeze "envisages

also the end to the construction of new launching pads for these missiles." His most significant clarification, however, was his reply to Western statements that Soviet missiles were merely being shifted to points beyond the Urals from which they could still target Western Europe: "I can say that no medium-range missile will be additionally deployed in places from which the Federal Republic of Germany and other countries of Western Europe could be within their reach."

*106. Eugene Rostow, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency recently confirmed [24] that the Soviet approach is based on two elements: first, a moratorium for the duration of the negotiations, and secondly, a programme of reductions based on the assumption that both sides are equal in intermediate range missiles with the objective of establishing a limitation of 300 systems for each side by 1990. He also indicated that during the second round of INF negotiations in May, the Soviet delegation presented a draft text of an agreement which would embody the Soviet position.

*107. Ambassador Rostow also outlined American objections to the Soviet proposal:

—While the United States draft treaty would ban both SS-20s and NATO's Pershing II and ground launched cruise missiles, the Soviet Treaty would eliminate only the NATO missiles in the European portion of the Soviet Union, and an unlimited number in the Far Eastern portion of the Soviet Union.

—The Soviet proposal includes the British and French nuclear capable systems in the aggregate ceilings for missiles and aircraft. In the United States view, this proposal is both technically flawed and inequitable in principle because:

  —first, most of the United Kingdom and French forces are not in fact intermediate range; they are SLBM forces identical with Soviet and United States SLBM forces. Most of the remainder are nuclear capable aircraft. According to Ambassador Rostow, the Soviet predominance in the intermediate-range nuclear capable systems in Europe is so great that there would be no justification for compensation to the Soviet Union for British and French nuclear forces even if they were under NATO command.

  —secondly, the claim of the Soviet Union for nuclear forces equal to or superior to those of all other nations combined would be unjustified. It is a demand for absolute security for one country which is tantamount to absolute insecurity for all other countries. In short, it is a Soviet demand for hegemony. This will never be acceptable to the United States.

  —thirdly, the INF negotiations are bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, both the United Kingdom and France have stated their refusal to have their forces limited or compensated for in negotiations between the two superpowers.

—Because of the inclusion of the British and French forces, the Soviet proposal would have the effect of forcing the almost total withdrawal from Europe of United States dual-capable aircraft while not affecting most Soviet dual-capable aircraft.

[24] "The future of Soviet-American Relations: where are we going in the nuclear arms talks." Eugene V. Rostow. Director, U.S. ACDA, address before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, 10th September, 1982.

DIFFERING APPROACHES

*108. The two sides, then, have adopted negotiating positions that are considerably far apart. On the two essential components—the "what" and the "where" of negotiations—the two sides are almost diametrically opposed. The United States wants a narrow approach on systems and a broad approach on geographic scope, while the Soviet Union wants the geographic scope restricted to the European theatre, but requires a broad approach on the systems to be included. There will also inevitably be differences over data. Some idea of the very different perspectives of either side on what forces should be counted can be seen from the official estimates put forward by either side of forces relevant to the European theatre. Richard Burt, then Director of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, presented the following figures in support of the claim made by President Reagan in November 1981 of a 6:1 advantage for the Warsaw Pact.

NATO		U.S.S.R.	
IRBM's	0	IRBM's:	
Aircraft:		SS–20	250
In Europe:		SS–4/5	350
F–111	164	SS–12/22	100
F–4	265	SSN–5	30
A6/7	68	Aircraft:	
Total	497	Backfire	45
Based in United States:		Badger/Blinder	350
FB–111	63	Fencer, Flogger, Fitter	2,700
Total	560	Total	3,825

109. In an interview with *Die Zeit*, President Brezhnev stated that Soviet estimates of the respective force totals were 986 for NATO and 975 for the Soviet Union. In information provided during the Fifth Pugwash workshop on nuclear forces in Europe (Geneva, December 1981), Soviet officials explained these estimates as follows:

UNITED STATES AND NATO		U.S.S.R.	
IRBM:		IRBM:	
French IRBM	18	SS–20	243
French SLBM	80	SS–4 and 5	253
United Kingdom Polaris	64	SSN–5	18
Aircraft:		Aircraft: Backfire, Badger, Blinder	461
United States:		Total	975
FB–111	65		
F–111	172		
F–4	246		
Carriers A6/7	240		
French Mirage IV	46		
United Kingdom Vulcan	55		
Total	986		

*110. The essential disagreements are these: Soviet figures for the West include French and British nuclear forces; they include 240 A6/7 by calculating the availability for six aircraft carriers (2 in the Mediterranean and four in the North Atlantic). For their own forces they do not include the SS–12 nor the 2700 Fencer, Flogger, Fitters on the grounds that their range is too short (beneath 1000 kms).

*111. Problems may also exist about verification, particularly since the Reagan administration has emphasised that it will seek more

stringent verification provisions than in past negotiations. Two problems areas are immediately relevant: the verification of conventionally armed as opposed to nuclear armed cruise missiles, a situation which will become more acute as the United States proceeds with its plan for the widespread deployment of cruise missiles; and the dual capable aircraft. If and when aircraft are considered, some means will be needed to differentiate between conventional and nuclear modes. American officials have stated repeatedly that the verification problems with regard to the cruise missile are not insurmountable.

*112. Finally, there is the issue of negotiating flexibility. The President's statement in his speech in November 1981, to the National Press Club that "We intend to negotiate in good faith and to go to Geneva willing to listen to and consider the proposals of our Soviet counterparts," indicated a measure of flexibility on the American side. However, by contrast, Assistant Secretary of Defence Richard Perle, replying to questions at a press conference, stated that there was no fall-back position.

*113. The degree of flexibility could be crucial in terms of a variation of the zero option: that zero should apply to those Soviet missiles targetted on Western Europe and that the Soviet Union should be allowed some compensation for regional threats, such as China.

Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)

*114. During his speech at Eureka College, in May 1982, President Reagan announced that recommencement of negotiations with the Soviet Union on the limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear weapons would take place soon. The President also announced that his goal was to reduce significantly the most destabilising systems, intercontinental ballistic missiles, the number of warheads they carry and their overall destructive potential. This would be achieved in a practical, phased reduction plan.

*115. The first phase would aim to reduce ballistic missile warheads to equal ceilings at least a third below current levels, of which no more than half would be land-based. A second phase would seek to achieve an equal ceiling on other elements of the strategic nuclear forces, including limits on ballistic missile throw weight at less than current American levels.

*116. Officials have now given greater detail concerning the number that these proposals will include. The Reagan START position reflects the administration's view of strategic stability—the belief that increased accuracy married to heavy missiles creates a first strike potential. The START proposals are designed to reduce this perceived first strike potential by limiting the land-based assets on either side, and by encouraging the deployment of invulnerable, preferably sea-based, systems. Because of the differing force structures of the two-sides, the proposal means greater reductions by the Soviet Union.

—In phase one, each side would be limited to 5,000 warheads on no more than 850 intercontinental land-based and sea-based missiles. Because the administration maintains that each side has nearly 7,500 warheads, the cuts would be equal. But because the Soviet Union deploys more missiles (about 2,400) than the United States

(1,700), the Soviet Union would have to cut twice as many missiles.

—The ceiling of 2,500 land-based warheads will also affect them more seriously since the Soviet Union has 5,500 warheads, or 70 percent of its total, on land-based missiles, compared with 2,152 or 20 percent for the United States. It is expected that these reductions would be phased over a 5- to 10-year period.

—In the second phase, both sides would reduce their payload or throw weight to 4 million pounds which would mean Soviet reductions of 7 million.

Despite the fact that neither bomber nor cruise missiles are mentioned, administration officials have stated that the United States will be prepared to discuss both.

*117. Observers have noted that the Reagan approach has been designed to accommodate the two current American strategic programmes under development

—the MX and Trident II. Administration officials point out that when deployed, these systems will result in a Soviet land-based vulnerability problem similar to that experienced by the United States today, in view of Soviet reliance on land-based systems. This, in their view, should make Soviet officials more interested in the American approach. With regard to the development of the MX and Trident missile, there is no indication whether these systems are on the bargaining table or are non-negotiable.

*118. The selection of warheads as the unit of account has given the United States position an equitable appearance since both sides would make approximately equal reductions. However, within the limitations, the Soviet Union is required to make major concessions both in numbers of missiles and in land-based systems. This emphasis on land-based strengths is compounded by the absence of bombers and cruise missiles from the initial limitations, both of which represent areas of American advantage. Administration officials have stated that the United States is willing to consider both. However, their inclusion raises substantial complications, not only in terms of classification and verification, but also in relation to the INF talks.

*119. The administration has insisted that it will require much stricter verification procedures. However, the new accounting method in both phases poses serious problems for any verification regime. Administration officials have commented that where provision cannot be monitored effectively by national technical means of verification, they will propose co-operative measures such as data exchanges and collateral constraints that can provide the necessary confidence in compliance. They point out that Soviet officials have confirmed that the Soviet Union will accept "reasonable verification measures" to supplement national technical means of verification. However, it is questionable whether American and Soviet views will accord as to what constitutes a "reasonable" verification measures.

*120. Finally, although the United States proposal talks of two phases there is considerable ambiguity as to whether this means that phase one and phase two will be negotiated as separate agreements or as a simple agreement. The latter course would inevitably mean extremely prolonged negotiations as it would mean settling the complex and somewhat contentions issue of throwweight reductions.

SOVIET ATTITUDES

*121. The Soviet Union has welcomed the United States' willingness to resume talks on strategic arms reductions as a step in the right direction, but Soviet officials have been highly critical of the actual terms of the American proposal. In a speech to the League of Young Communists in Moscow, President Brezhnev did not reject the Reagan initiative but defined Soviet conditions for arms control negotiations: first, talks should pursue the aim of limiting and reducing strategic arms rather than being a cover for the continued arms race and the breakdown of what he termed parity; secondly, both sides should pay due regard to each other's legitimate and equal security; and thirdly, in an obvious reference to SALT II, the Soviet leader emphasized that the positive achievement of earlier talks should not be overlooked, since the coming negotiations could start from scratch.

*122. The Soviet premier criticised the details of the American proposal as being "absolutely one-sided" because it excluded all the weapons the United States was developing most intensively. In this sense, Mr. Brezhnev argued that the United States seemed to be aiming not for an agreement, but for the achievement of military superiority over the Soviet Union.

*123. According to recent reports [25] the Soviet Union has proposed equal ceilings of 1800 long-range missiles and bombers. These same reports also suggested the Soviet Union had made proposals that would effectively link the INF and START negotiations, that is, they offered to make substantial cuts in their long-range missile and bomber forces, but in return demanded that the United States forego the deployment of new medium-range missiles in Europe and accept stringent restrictions on all future cruise missile deployment.

*124. According to United States officials, the Soviet proposal also expressed willingness to establish an overall ceiling on the number of nuclear warheads carried by long-range missiles and bombers.

CHAPTER IV—PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

*125. Despite mounting domestic opposition in a number of member countries to the deployment of new land-based missiles, most NATO governments are determined to maintain the 12 December consensus on the dual-track decision of modernisation and arms control. This determination is fuelled by several related considerations: the belief that the decision accurately reflects NATO's requirements; the belief that, irrespective of its merits, the NATO decision is vital for Alliance cohesion; and the belief that implementation of the decision offers the only route to serious negotiations. The Soviet Union will only negotiate if it is convinced of NATO seriousness and solidarity.

*126. Because of this determination, member governments are unwilling to reconsider any element of the NATO decision. This includes the sea-basing option which was considered by the High Level Group and discarded for sound political and military reasons.

*127. Because of the proximity of INF deployments, 1983 could prove crucial in determining whether the Alliance will be able to sustain the 12 December, 1979 dual-track decision. In this respect two fac-

[25] New York *Times*, 1st August, 1982.

tors will be of particular significance: first, public perceptions of the START and INF negotiations and the degree of progress achieved in either set of negotiations; and secondly, the degree to which the Alliance can retain public support for a credible strategy of deterrence which involves the threatened use of nuclear weapons.

*128. Public unease both in Europe and the United States over what is seen as an unending and pointless escalation in nuclear weapons by both super powers will mean that the arms control negotiations in Geneva will be the subject of public interest. The fact that negotiations on INF and START are in progress is in itself a positive achievement, but because of the degree of public concern and the nature of the NATO dual track decision, dialogue alone will not be enough. Many people will want to see tangible proof that the objective of the negotiations is to reduce the levels of nuclear weapons rather than to legitimise new developments.

*129. In the search for common ground on which to build the basis for an agreement, it is notable that the START negotiations currently provide more grounds for optimism. The Soviet reply to the initial American proposal was in several respects more constructive and promising than many American officials had expected. The Soviet response was considerably quicker and more substantive than was expected: their own proposal suggested ceilings lower than those of the SALT II Treaty and they did not utterly reject the American proposals.

*130. However, in the INF talks the two sides remain far apart and it is difficult to see any common ground in the two opening positions. This situation places the Alliance in a dilemma. Alliance officials believe that the Soviet Union will only modify its negotiating position when it sees that NATO is determined to implement the dual-track decision, in other words, when NATO begins to make its initial deployments of Pershing II's and cruise missiles. Yet at the same time, Alliance officials acknowledge that in the current political environment deployments could be difficult to implement unless there are signs of real progress in Geneva. Thus NATO is faced with a dilemma: progress in negotiations may depend on deployment, but deployment may depend on progress in negotiations.

*131. In order to solve this dilemma Alliance officials will have to begin to look for greater flexibility in the Alliance negotiating approach, that is give consideration to what variation of the "zero option" would represent an acceptable outcome. But this position has distinct negotiating disadvantages. Most officials associated with the negotiations hold the position that the Soviet Union will not negotiate seriously until the Alliance demonstrates its determination to deploy new missiles. To propose a fall-back position at this point would be to suggest a weakening of this determination as well as give the Soviet Union concessions which it would have no need to reciprocate. Moreover, most officials think the zero solution is the best possible outcome of the negotiations and remains realistic. (It must be added that non-official experts regard the zero solution as the best possible outcome but thoroughly unrealistic.) To indicate a fall-back position at this time in the negotiations would, in fact, amount to an abandonment of the zero solution. Finally, looking at alternative versions of the "zero option" would necessitate examining what number below the estimated 572 systems would be militarily acceptable, practical,

and cost effective, and how a lower number would be shared among the Allies.

*132. An additional issue that will have to be resolved concerns the link between START and INF. While most Alliance officials agree that at some stage the two sets of negotiations will have to be related to each other, no one is willing to specify how this will be done. Yet the evident problems of reconciling global and regional limitations on cruise missiles and aircraft and the question of French and British nuclear capable forces point to the necessity of an overall approach. Soviet officials have also linked the two negotiations by stating that an agreement in START would be dependent on a resolution of the cruise missile issue. The United States has also acknowledged the close relations of the two negotiations through its operating procedures. The two negotiations are supported in Washington D.C. by a single interagency group, while in Geneva the two negotiating teams maintain extremely close contact, including daily meetings of the deputy negotiators and twice weekly meetings of the chief negotiators.

*133. Another major problem concerns Alliance nuclear strategy. It is widely acknowledged that for technical and political reasons the Alliance should carry out substantial adjustments to its theatre nuclear doctrine and capabilities. These adjustments could involve reductions in the numbers of battlefield nuclear systems and a consequent shift away from a reliance on 'early use' of nuclear weapons; a greater emphasis on long-range systems; and an increase in conventional capabilities. The HLG is apparently now working with some seriousness on a review of battlefield nuclear systems. Alliance officials must formulate this strategy in terms of both doctrine and capabilities, in a manner that is acceptable to, and can be supported by, public opinion.

PART II—A COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY ANALYSIS

This section is intended to inform members of the major positions adopted by the United States and the Soviet Union, and of the situation regarding the NATO dual-track decision in those countries selected for deployments and of the range of national views held in these countries concerning this issue.

The country studies are based on the visits of the Special Committee to the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and Belgium, members' contributions and staff research. They are not definitive and will be amended and up-dated to take account of developments and of members' views.

The United States

134. The airing of European concerns about the effect on European security of shifting military balances stimulated the United States to undertake new analyses of the Soviet threat and set about resolving the newly posed concerns. The replacement of less-accurate, stationary Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (IRMBs) in the Soviet Union by mobile, mirved and highly-accurate SS–20s, together with the deployment of the Backfire bomber, was a cause of immediate concern. These new Soviet medium range nuclear capabilities combined with the achievement by the superpowers or rough strategic parity to reemphasize Western conventional inferiority and to raise questions about the credibility of deterrence and the "coupling" of Europe and the United States.

135. As the nuclear guarantor of the Alliance, the United States has had the problem of making extended deterrence credible. As was noted earlier (see the chapter on "The Evolution of NATO's Nuclear Doctrine"), the United States tried to do this through a number of procedural and technical measures, without compromising the principle of ultimate American control of nuclear weapons.

136. The balance between involving Allies and maintaining control was given another dimension by the commencement of strategic arms control negotiations (the SALT process) between the United States and the Soviet Union. From the beginning of the SALT process, the United States, with varying degrees of success attempted to keep the Allies fully informed of developments in the negotiations, while respecting the limitations imposed by the bilateral nature of the talks. During the mid-1970's, as the implications of the SALT II Treaty for European security became clearer, consultation became a critical issue within the Alliance and the importance to European security of the new weapons being deployed by the Soviet Union intensified the need for consultations. It became evident that the traditional institutional

methods of consulting on nuclear issues were insufficient and that new mechanisms were required that would allow greater European participation. These mechanisms were provided with the creation of the High Level Group (HLG) and the Special Group (SG). For the first time, the Europeans were directly involved from the beginning in the evolution of an Alliance nuclear modernization decision.

137. The High Level Group was established in NATO to study ways for an appropriate military and political response to the new Soviet nuclear weapons. The Special Group was created alongside the HLG to study possible arms control options. As is known, the HLG and SG came up with the "dual-track" proposal ratified in December 1979. Shortly before that decision was announced, however, Soviet President Leonid I. Brezhnev proposed a moratorium on IRBM deployment. NATO quickly rejected the proposal, viewing it as a misguided attempt to halt the NATO modernization decision and its implementation.

138. The evolution of the NATO dual-track decision must be viewed within the context of the SALT II negotiations taking place at the time, because the expectations of SALT II ratification played an important part in framing the NATO decision. Within this context, the two tracks of the decision take on special significance. With regard to the deployment-track, numerous Europeans had expressed concerns with the SALT II Protocol limiting the deployment of cruise missiles, and the possible extension of the Protocol restrictions beyond 31st December, 1981. On the other hand, the negotiation-track of the decision gained special significance in the SALT II was still exclusively concerned with strategic systems—thus excluding both the SS-20 and the Backfire bomber. Even with SALT ratification, an unlimited expansion in non-strategic nuclear systems was possible and, indeed, probable, given limitations on strategic systems. Concern over a one-sided non-strategic nuclear build-up, was widespread.

139. At an early stage in the consideration of the modernization decision therefore, considerable attention was directed to the incorporation of "theatre" systems arms control negotiations within the SALT III framework. In particular, the need for "global ceilings" was stressed, in order to avoid any notion of a "Euro-strategic" balance, with all its implications of de-coupling. Considerable thought was given to the practicality and advisability of multi-lateral SALT III negotiations to replace the bi-lateral scope of previous SALT talks. In general, the United States and its Allies favoured a bi-lateral scope, especially in view of the unlikely prospect of incorporating French and British systems in the arms control negotiations. Recognizing the deep engagement of European security concerns in these negotiations, it was generally agreed that close consultations among the Allies through HLG and SG were imperative. The type of close consultations characteristic of SALT II in its later stages was considered exemplary and a model to be followed for SALT III. Moreover, while global ceilings and the avoidance of Euro-strategic parity were viewed as desirable, multi-level negotiations were favoured, since the all-encompassing nature of single-level talks would make negotiations excessively complicated and reduce the likelihood of rapid agreement. SALT III, it was thought, could have one negotiating track dealing directly with European-based systems, while another negotiating track considered strategic systems.

140. The general concern with the integration of Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiations into the SALT III framework was temporarily sidetracked, however, with the defeat of SALT II. Strong opposition within the U.S. Senate, in 1979, had caused considerable doubt about the Treaty's future. Opposition centred on a number of points, among them that the Backfire bomber was indeed a strategic weapon system; that nothing was done to offset the Soviet advantage in heavy missiles; that while U.S. ICBMs were becoming increasingly vulnerable, the Treaty did not address this; that the limits on cruise missiles were too restrictive; that verification was inadequate; and, lastly, that the SALT process in general had done nothing to halt the Soviet military build-up and in fact had placed the United States in a position of permanent inferiority.

141. If this strong opposition was not enough to raise doubts over the wisdom of ratifying SALT II, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979 was. President Carter postponed consideration of the Treaty by the Senate, where it was already in deep trouble. Despite the non-ratification of SALT II, the United States opened preliminary consultative talks with the Soviet Union on INF in October 1980, following Chancellor Schmidt's visit to Moscow in July. The U.S. Presidential elections in November overtook these preliminary talks. During the election campaign President Carter and candidate Reagan differed sharply over SALT II. The latter reiterated the firm opposition to the Treaty some Senators had voiced earlier, while Carter promised to seek ratification immediately upon his re-election. With President Reagan's election, the demise of SALT II was assured.

142. The approach of the early Reagan administration to arms control was admittedly disturbing for many Europeans. The failure of the U.S. Senate to ratify SALT II after 7 years of negotiations under three American administrations and after intense consultations with the Allies, particularly in the later stages, was a serious blow to widespread European expectations and a very serious disappointment. Other signals on arms control issues during the early months of the administration, combined with the emphasis on military priorities, military might, and an apparently uncompromising stance toward the Soviet Union, fixed in the mind of many Europeans the notion that arms control possibilities were only a remote concern, at best, for Reagan officials. There was the long delay in the appointment of leading officials to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. When key appointments finally came, it was stated that it would be 9 months—sometime in early 1982—before the review of strategic planning would be completed and therefore at least 9 months before the SALT talks would be resumed. There was the appointment of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency of officials not known to be sympathetic to arms control. There was the apparent reluctance to continue preliminary talks on INF negotiations, giving the impression—again in combination with other U.S. foreign policy elements—that the Reagan administration was interested in modernizing NATO's long-range theatre nuclear forces, but not in negotiating reductions, eroding the public support for the dual-track decision in some countries. It all added up to another important impression—that the United States was not particularly interested in concerns many Allies found vital and fundamental and was not listening to Europeans, however much

the United States talked about the importance of NATO and consultations.

143. Notwithstanding these initial impressions, European Allies continued to push the Reagan administration for positive initiatives in the field of arms control and to emphasize the dual-track nature of NATO's modernisation decision. Public opinion in Europe, expressing its strong opposition to nuclear weapons through public demonstrations, probably exerted a certain influence on the Reagan administration to re-take the initiative on INF issues. In his first major foreign policy speech on 18th November, 1981, President Reagan announced a number of arms control objectives. Among them was the proposal of the "zero option" as the basis of the INF talks in general, which were to start at the end of November 1981.

144. The Special Consultative Group (SCG) was instrumental in the formulation of the NATO-supported United States position at the Intermediate Nuclear Force negotiations. The SCG strongly supported the zero proposal and urged "concrete negotiated results at the earliest possible time." Consultants between the United States and its NATO Allies were reportedly satisfactory to the Europeans, and the United States indicated great satisfaction with them as well. As then Assistant Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, former Special Consultative Group leader, remarked, "The intensity of the Special Consultative Group consultations since the Rome ministerial meeting in May (1981) symbolizes the American commitment to Allied interests, as well as the common desire of the United States and its Allies to achieve genuine arms control. These consultations played an invaluable role in developing the United States negotiating position."

145. Nearly 6 months after the American proposal of the zero option at the Geneva INF negotiations, President Reagan announced his proposals for the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), which were to commence in June 1982. Again, it appears that European support for a balanced approach to nuclear issues played a part. Not only did the Europeans insist on the need for vigorous arms control following the demise of SALT, but, equally as important, there was growing concern that the INF talks in Geneva were taking place in isolation of strategic weapons negotiations. This latter feeling renewed the fear that arms control negotiations on European-based systems, isolated from strategic talks, could lead to the establishment of an Euro-strategic balance with potentially severe implications for the coupling of the United States to Europe. In addition, it seems that President Reagan might have been responding to increasing domestic opposition to his nuclear politics, as expressed by the nuclear "freeze movement" in the United States.

146. Both INF and START talks are now taking place in Geneva. It is to be hoped that concrete results can be reached, although the timeframe appears to be on the long, rather than the short side. With respect to the connection of the INF talks to the START Negotiations, it appears that earlier agreements made at the time of the formulation of the dual-track decision are being kept. The director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Eugene V. Rostow, said, in November 1981, that the United States would make every effort to keep the two negotiations "on the same track and that the positions taken are

compatible with each other." He continued by saying that it might well be "that at a given point we could combine them."

147. A significant development in the United States during 1982 has been the growing public concern with the unrestrained proliferation of nuclear weapons, a possible new round in the nuclear arms race, and the threat of nuclear war. President Reagan's earlier position regarding strengthened strategic nuclear programmes, combined with the increased military budget, the large budget deficit, an economic recession, and growing alarm with nuclear weapons, have all played a role in the growing movement. The nuclear concerns have found expression on the grass-roots level with town councils in numerous states passing freeze resolutions and on the national level with resolutions tabled in both houses of Congress. In March 1982, Senators Kennedy and Hatfield introduced a nuclear freeze proposal, with 18 co-sponsors, calling for the United States and U.S.S.R. "to decide when and how to achieve a mutual and verifiable freeze on the testing, production and further deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles and other delivery systems." A similar resolution was introduced in the House, co-sponsored by 129 Representatives.

148. The Kennedy-Hatfield Resolution attracted widespread attention and support. Other sections of Congress, however, opposed the Kennedy-Hatfield approach. Senators Jackson and Warner introduced a counter-resolution, calling for "a long-term, mutual and verifiable nuclear force freeze at equal and sharply reduced levels of forces." The Reagan administration backed the latter resolution, which counted 56 co-sponsors in the Senate. The Kennedy-Hatfield Resolution was defeated in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in June. Voting was on strictly party lines. The House resolution passed the House Foreign Affairs Committee by 28 to 8 votes, but was defeated in August on the House floor. Instead, the House adopted a resolution similar to that introduced by Senators Jackson and Warner by 204 to 202 votes.

149. Despite its defeat in both the Senate committee and on the House floor, the Kennedy-Hatfield proposal may be a powerful issue in some November mid-term elections. The freeze proposal was adopted by the Democratic Party's miniconvention in June and has received powerful backing from potential Democratic Presidential candidates, including former Vice-President Walter F. Mondale. The attractiveness of the freeze issue to a wide range of public opinion was also demonstrated by a June rally in New York's Central Park, which drew 750,000 people.

150. The differing views on an immediate proposal are perhaps more easily explained with reference to the distinct views of the Soviet-U.S. strategic nuclear balance. In general, nuclear freeze proponents point out that an essential parity exists on the strategic level; that the notion of a "window of vulnerability" (meaning the Soviet capacity to launch a disarming counterforce strike against U.S. ICBMs, leaving the U.S. President with no option but to surrender in order to avoid mutual suicide) is a scientific, technological, and strategic nightmare; that "war-fighting" and indeed counterforce capabilities are destabilising; that "Mutual Assured Destruction" remains the best strategic posture; and that, given essential parity, it is both in the

Soviet and U.S. interests to achieve reductions in strategic systems following the adoption of a freeze.

151. Opponents of an immediate freeze, including the Reagan administration, have opposite views on the strategic balance and therefore oppose a freeze before reductions in system levels to equal levels are achieved. They maintain that an immediate freeze would lock the United States in a position of permanent inferiority; that this would eliminate any Soviet incentive to negotiate reductions; that counterforce capabilities strengthen deterrence by eliminating any Soviet advantage in this category; that such a capability, provided by the strategic modernisations proposed, would close the "window of vulnerability"; and that a freeze now would undermine the dual-track nature of the NATO LRTNF decision.

152. This last point is of some significance to the Special Committee. It is unclear whether the proponents of a nuclear freeze have clearly thought through the implications of such a freeze on NATO's nuclear posture, and, consequently, its cohesion. To eliminate the modernisation track of NATO's LRTNF decision is to discard the rationale of that decision. It would not only lock NATO in permanent inferiority at the "Euro-strategic" level, given the 324 SS-20s presently deployed in the Soviet Union, but would, consequently, reduce the credibility of NATO's military doctrine of flexible response. Equally as important, by eliminating the modernisation track of the dual-track decision, NATO would be put in a weakened negotiating position. It is inconceivable that the Soviet Union would unilaterally withdraw its IRBMs without any incentive, other than NATO's goodwill, to do so.

The Soviet Union

153. A number of major proposals regarding European-based nuclear systems have been advanced by the Soviet Union. Soviet suggestions to open negotiations on these systems began prior to December 1979 while NATO concerns about growing Soviet nuclear capabilities were increasing and NATO was still in the process of debating and formulating its response.

154. During the May 1978 meetings of Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev and FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in Bonn, the Soviet President expressed Soviet willingness to negotiate about nuclear as well as conventional weapons in Europe. In a passage that, at the time, was considered highly significant, it was stated that neither side would seek superiority. President Brezhnev repeated the Soviet willingness to negotiate on nuclear weapons in Europe in early 1979. The first major Soviet proposal was launched by President Brezhnev in East Berlin on 6th October, 1979 on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the independence of the GDR. President Brezhnev stated that during the last 10 years, the number of Soviet launchers had not been increased by a single missile or airplane. In fact, he stated, the total power of the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons forces had been decreased, as had the number of medium-range nuclear bombers. He said the Soviet Union was prepared to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons in Soviet Europe, if no additional medium-range nuclear weapons carriers were deployed in Western Europe. He added that the Soviet Union would never use nuclear weapons against countries

which did not possess them or in which no nuclear weapons were deployed. NATO immediately rejected this proposal as a patent propaganda effort to halt the modernisation decision and to promote division within the Alliance.

155. Following the 12th December decision, Soviet officials maintained that the very basis for negotiations had been nullified. The basic Soviet argument was that a rough equivalence of medium-range systems already existed. The Soviet Union argued that the SS–20 was a modernisation programme to replace the SS–4s and SS–5s, and not an expansion programme, and dismissed the idea that the SS–20 constituted a significant new threat to the West. Moreover, the future deployment of Pershing II's and cruise missiles were seen as strategic threats, since they could hit the Soviet homeland.

156. For 6 months the Soviet Union refused the possibility of negotiations. Following Chancellor Schmidt's visit to Moscow in June 1980, the Soviet Union dropped its precondition that NATO rescind its 12th December decision, and, despite the nonratification of SALT II, agreed that preliminary discussions on limiting medium-range systems could begin. The Soviets took the position that American forward-based systems (FBS) should be included in the negotiations and stated that no agreement or treaty could be implemented before the ratification of SALT II.

157. A further major proposal was then advanced by the Soviet President at the 26th Party Congress in February 1981. Mr. Brezhnev proposed that nuclear weapons systems in Europe be frozen at current levels and a moratorium be established on the deployment of any new nuclear systems in Europe. This proposal was later reiterated during the Schmidt-Brezhnev meetings of November 1981; the proposed moratorium was still conditional either on NATO's non-deployment or on a NATO refusal to deploy while the INF negotiations in Geneva were still in process. NATO rejected both proposals immediately, since, among other reasons, it would not require any reduction of Soviet missiles for the duration of the negotiations.

158. President Reagan's proposal of the "zero option" as the basis for INF negotiations, advanced in November 1981, was quickly rejected by the Soviet Union. At the negotiations in Geneva, which opened in November 1981, the Soviets continue to maintain that an essential balance already exists in Europe, reaching this conclusion in part by including the British and French independent nuclear forces. The U.S. maintains that the Soviet Union has a 3–1 or 6–1 nuclear advantage, depending on what systems are counted. Notwithstanding this disagreement, the Soviet Union, in February 1982, introduced a proposal which envisaged a two-thirds reduction in European-based systems by 1990. Because this would perpetuate the imbalance, albeit at lower levels, U.S. and NATO officials rejected this proposal.

159. In an address to the Soviet Trade Unions on 16th March, 1982, President Brezhnev announced that the Soviet Union had unilaterally halted deployment of the SS–20 in the European Soviet Union. He also announced that the Soviet Union intended to make unilateral reductions later in 1982 "unless there is a new aggravation of the international situation," and that it remained ready to negotiate serious reductions of all medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. The Soviet President's speech was noteworthy for two other passages, one in

which he proposed a "mutual restriction of naval operations," and one in which he made a veiled threat to respond to NATO deployments by increasing Soviet nuclear capabilities in the Western hemisphere.

160. The Brezhnev March 1982 proposal was not generally considered new, and Allied reactions were extremely reserved, ranging from a French official's statement that it was "nothing new" to the Italian Foreign Ministry's statement that Brezhnev's intention to negotiate still had to be proved. At its March 1982 meeting in Colorado Springs, the Nuclear Planning Group rejected any moratorium proposal, and United States spokesmen have spoken against it firmly and persuasively. Allied officials see the moratorium as freezing the Soviet Intermediate Nuclear Force monopoly of land-based systems and United States medium-range inferiority at the same time that it undermines Soviet incentives to negotiate seriously in Geneva. It is viewed basically as an attempt to appeal to public opinion, to fuel the anti-nuclear "peace" movement, and, ultimately, to split NATO and undo the 1979 dual-track decision. The unilateral Brezhnev moratorium on deployments in Soviet Europe is seen as fundamentally meaningless, since it does not restrain deployments East of the Urals, from where the SS–20s can still threaten Europe, and it would last only as long as the NATO countries did not "actually go over to practical preparations to deploy Pershing II missiles and cruise missiles in Europe." Since preparations have, in fact, already begun, the Soviets could invoke the latter conditions as an escape clause at any time.

161. Moreover, despite the announcement of a unilateral moratorium, deployment of the SS–20 is continuing and now has reached a total of 324 systems. More ominous is the gradual emergence of evidence, apparently not yet conclusive, indicating that SS–20s are probably being deployed with one additional reload rocket. The SS–20 is known to have a fast reload capability. The number of SS–20s already deployed, plus the reload, suggests a very powerful Soviet medium-range nuclear capability.

162. With regard to President Reagan's START proposal, the Soviet response has been almost totally negative They continue to insist that any negotiations should be conducted on the basis of SALT II, which they have ratified. In the course of the START negotiations, however, the Soviets have also tabled their own proposal, which calls for a reduction in the total number of long-range missiles and bombers to 1,800 (entailing a Soviet reduction of about 700 systems and a U.S. reduction of about 200). In return, Moscow demands that the United States forego the deployment of LRTNF in Europe. The latter demand has been wholly unacceptable, although the former proposal was not rejected out of hand. At the same time, the Soviet Union reiterated that the "best elements" of the SALT II Treaty should form the basis of a new agreement.

163. To this brief résumé of the major positions the Soviet Union has adopted on intermediate range and strategic nuclear arms negotiations must be added a note on the short-lived independent peace movement in Moscow. On 4th June 1982, an eleven-person group of Soviet citizens held a press conference with Western correspondents in Moscow to announce the formation of the "Committee to Establish Trust between the U.S.S.R. and the USA." Its goals were relatively modest—to form

a movement for disarmament and peace, to encourage greater United States-U.S.S.R. citizen contact, and to open discussion on questions of war and peace. Within days, all but one of the members were called in by the police and warned about continuing these activities, which were considered illegal, provocative, and anti-social. The members of the group were harassed by police in other ways. Before some 300 International Peace Marchers arrived in Moscow, some members were warned to leave the city, others were jailed, and the rest were kept under surveillance, so they could not meet the marchers. According to reports, the artist-leader of the Committee was eventually put in a psychiatric institution. Soviet media have given extensive coverage to Western anti-nuclear demonstrations, and the Soviet Union has been known to sympathise with, if not support, anti-nuclear groups in the West. While there is a very large Soviet Peace Council, it is kept under strict control.

The Federal Republic of Germany

164. The West German concern with the imbalance in theatre nuclear forces was instrumental in developing the INF modernisation proposal, and German political criteria were extremely important in establishing the components of the NATO decision.

165. At the time of the NATO decision, the government was composed of a coalition formed by the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP).[26] In developing the government's position, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was instrumental in blending the requirements of military security and détente into the final decision with equal emphasis. To do so was a political necessity, since a significant section of the SPD tended to emphasise the need for negotiations more than for modernisation, while other elements of the SPD and the junior partners of the coalition, the FDP, emphasised the need for modernisation to offset a growing imbalance and threat. The Chancellor's success in achieving widespread and strong support for the dual-track proposal lay in recognising the strong feeling within the SPD that every effort be made to safeguard relations with the East and that arms control efforts be at least equally emphasised. At the 1979 SPD Congress, the Chancellor received a clear mandate for the government's position, and his resounding personal success was demonstrated in the vote by which he was elected Party Chairman—360 in favour, 24 opposed and 16 abstentions.

166. The Free Democratic Party (FDP), particularly through Foreign Minister Genscher, tended to place a higher priority than did the SPD on the necessity to modernise in order to offset the growing INF imbalance. In Genscher's view, the Soviet Union bore responsibility for any TNF arms build-up.

167. The opposition parties, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian Social Union (CSU), supported the government's position on the NATO proposal, but, more strongly than the governing coalition, emphasised the need for NATO to modernise in response to the Soviet build-up. The official CDU/CSU position has maintained that it would be ideal if all European Allies accepted direct participation in the modernisation programme, but it still con-

[26] The composition of the Bundestag 1976–1980 was as follows: SPD—224 members (including 10 members from Berlin); FDP—40 members (including 1 member from Berlin); CDU/CSU—253 members (including 11 members from Berlin); Independent—1 member.

sidered the programme sound if only some Allies accepted. Further, the CDU did not (and still does not) accept the Chancellor's position that the Federal Republic could never be the only Ally to accept deployment and viewed with some concern the tendency in the Left wing of the SPD to accent arms control over modernisation.

168. The October 1980 elections in the Federal Republic of Germany returned the SPD/FDP coalition to the government.[27] After those elections and the November 1980 election of President Reagan in the United States, opposition to the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles on German territory grew in the early months of 1981. Opposition appeared to be fuelled primarily by a perception that the Reagan administration was attempting to downgrade the negotiating track of the modernisation decision, a perception strengthened by the failure of the American Senate to ratify SALT II and the relative unimportance President Reagan appeared to attach to arms control negotiations immediately following his election. The fact that it would be months before the Reagan administration completed its policy review of the SALT process and its strategic requirements; that key policy-making positions in the Department of Defense and in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency were filled slowly; that American spokesmen at meetings of the SCG in Brussels and at the NPG April meeting in Bonn were at first reluctant to suggest a date, in terms however vague, for an opening of negotiations on LRTNF; that the Reagan administration was linking arms control negotiations to Soviet behaviour toward Poland in a manner more direct than European governments felt they could support—all these developments eroded the confidence that the negotiating track of the NATO 1979 two-track decision would be implemented.

169. While, on the one hand, there was a widespread sense that the negotiating track was being underemphasized by the U.S. administration, there was, on the other, a sense that the military-security aspects were becoming overemphasized. The sometimes strident anti-Soviet rheotoric of the administration; the reference to Kremlin leaders as "liars and cheats"; the assertion that limited nuclear war in Europe was possible; the assertive manner in which Secretary of State Alexander Haig revealed the possibility of launching a nuclear warning shot, the decision to produce Enhanced Radiation Warheads (ERW) and, in general, the continuous references made to the Soviet threat, and the enlarged defence budget required to meet that threat adequately—all these fuelled the latent fears within sectors of the West German public. The 1979 dual-track decision, consequently, became a focal point of opposition and discontent.

170. Chancellor Schmidt worked assiduously to keep the Left wing of the Party supportive of the 1979 decision, but it was a difficult and apparently not always successful effort. In the early months of 1981, when the possibility even for opening LRTNF negotiations appeared remote, the SPD Left wing was increasingly vocal, with several voices raising demands for a review of the dual-track decision.

171. Adding to this growing restiveness was the proposal by President Brezhnev at the 26th Party Congress in February 1981 for a mora-

[27] After the October 1980 elections, the Bundestag composition has been the following: SPD—228 members (including 10 members from Berlin); FDP—54 members (including 1 member from Berlin); CDU/CSU—237 members (including 11 members from Berlin).

torium on nuclear weapons deployment—a proposal NATO quickly rejected as propagandist, designed to freeze Soviet superiority and to drive a wedge into the Alliance. In a Bundestag speech in early April 1981, the Chancellor used unusually harsh language to criticise the Soviet Union, referring to the Soviet weapons programmes in this way: "This massive military disproportion represents a massive political danger." In the very important vote following the Bundestag debate on the dual-track decision in late May, the Chancellor received a comfortable majority, including a large majority of the Left wing SPD, yet it was thought highly significant that five SPD deputies voted against the motion, six abstained, and four expressed reservations.

172. For those who, in early 1981, were doubting the credibility of the American commitment to negotiate, greater balance was restored through a series of developments. Perhaps the most important development was the May 1981 ministerial meeting in Rome and its final communiqué, in which the importance attached to both tracks of the decision was reiterated and it was announced that LRTNF negotiations with the Soviet Union would open before the end of the year. Other statements by American officials, including a letter in July from President Reagan to Chancellor Schmidt expressing American commitment to open negotiations before the end of the year, and Secretary of State Haig's announced meeting with the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, in New York in September, as well as the successive meetings during the summer of the HLG and the SCG, served to reinforce the credibility of the American commitment.

173. The Chancellor's position and the decision of NATO received a powerful thrust of support when the newly-elected French President, François Mitterand, solidly endorsed the German position at the Franco-German summit in Bonn in early July, emphasising the need to negotiate from a position of strength. The debate between the two tendencies within the SPD received an additional stimulus following the trip of Willy Brandt to Moscow in July. After carefully examining Mr. Brandt's claims that the Soviets were taking slightly newer positions on the LRTNF negotiations, the "zero option," and the proposed moratorium, government spokesmen concluded that in fact the statements differed in no significant way from earlier Soviet positions.

174. The CDU/CSU interpreted the growth of nuclear opposition differently. According to an influential spokesman, it was Moscow's propaganda, supported by the German Communist Party and its affiliates, that became more influential during this period by exploiting "misperceptions of President Reagan's policy and the illusions on détente still persisting, despite Afghanistan and Poland." Furthermore, it maintained (and continues to maintain) that doubts about the credibility of the Reagan administration's commitment to the LRTNF negotiations were also stirred up by leaders of the SPD Left wing and by SPD/FDP youth organisations. By way of contrast, the CDU/CSU, the strongest political party, supported the 1979 NATO dual-track decision and adherence to the Alliance unanimously. The CDU/CSU maintained that opponents constituted a small minority—albeit vociferous and with easy access to the mass media—and that the huge majority in the Federal Republic was still confident of American credibility.

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175. Whatever fuelled the growing opposition, there can be no doubt of its increasing importance. Not only did a grass roots anti-nuclear opposition emerge, but within the main coalition partners, the Left wing of the SPD became increasingly vocal with some again demanding a review of the dual-track decision. The numerous motions tabled by the SPD Left wing at the party's April 1982 convention in Munich included a call for an outright rejection of the NATO decision as well as a call for a moratorium on the deployment of U.S. weapons as long as the United States-Soviet INF talks in Geneva continued. Both motions were resoundingly rejected and the Congress instead voted overwhelmingly to endorse the Government's position.

176. Outside the circle of established political parties, the anti-nuclear opposition has grown in size and in intensity, particularly in the period 1980 to June 1982, and its political influence increased accordingly. It is important to recognize that the anti-nuclear movement in the FRG is a loosely knit federation of various political and religious groups which finds its sole unity in opposition to the modernisation decision. Parts of the movement are either religiously inspired pacifists or anti-nuclear groups who share none of the political aims of a small pro-Soviet minority. Other parts are composed of pro-defence minded sectors of the public who seek to halt the deployment of more nuclear weapons on German soil, viewing such deployment as destabilising without increasing deterrence; the point of some of these groups is to strengthen non-nuclear defences. The increasingly important Green Movement—itself a coalition of ecologists, feminists, nuclear pacifists, and anti-nuclear power adherents—has supported the pacifist and some neutralist sectors of the movement. Its credibility was challenged, however, following reports of a meeting attended by some of its members, among them Roland Vogt, a member of the Greens' party executive and Chairman of the Federal Association of Citizens Initiatives, with Libyan leader Colonel Moamar Qadhafi. Colonel Qadhafi reportedly urged his interlocutors to seek peaceful means to ensure the removal of U.S. bases and, if peaceful means failed, to resort to military efforts. The German Peace Society United War Resisters, a strong pacifist group within the anti-nuclear movement, is described by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution as having Communists in leading positions.

177. The amalgamation of different groupings within the anti-nuclear movement is reflected in the diversity of political aims and activities. Moral opposition to nuclear weapons or to nuclear power combines with fears of war and with strains of pacifism, neutralism, nationalism, and anti-Americanism to produce a wide array of opinions and goals. The unity in this diversity is opposition to LRTNF, and mass action is not a demonstration for particular programmes, but expression of opposition to LRTNF. It is in this light that the demonstrations during the last year must be seen. Although police estimates and those of rally organisers diverge widely with regard to the number of participants, the significance of the numbers cannot be missed. Between 350,000 and 480,000 people demonstrated at various sites during the Easter weekend. Again during President Reagan's visit to Bonn in June, some 350,000 marched to oppose the deployment of LRTNF in Europe, far exceeding the expected 150,000.

178. The Krefield Appeal,[28] which called for opposition to the deployment of LRTNF on German territory, appears to have lost momentum during the past year, but it must be recalled that in Fall, 1981, more than 1 million had signed it.

179. During the anti-nuclear movement's mass action against the modernisation decision, proponents have not been sitting still. In June, the Christian Democratic Party organised a pro-American rally, which attracted about 150,000 people. Reports in the mass media of an "anti-American" or anti-NATO FRG, then, clearly tend to be one-sided, and, while the media can easily exemplify opposition as seen in demonstrations, they largely ignore the majority opinion in favour of the Alliance and its decisions.

180. Convinced of the course of action it has taken with NATO to ensure continued Western security by negotiating as low a limit as possible on LRTNF as negotiations wth the Soviets will allow and by strengthening deterrence, the Schmidt government and the major political parties launched a public information programme and took issue with the critique of opponents. Chancellor Schmidt stated that he could not take the Krefield Appeal seriously since it did not mention Soviet LRTNF capabilities. "Peace is not created," Chancellor Schmidt said, "when one renders oneself defenceless against the armament of threat of another." He also stated that several supporters of the Krefield Appeal were members of the Communist Party and the Appeal was a "tool" of Soviet policy. "There is no word of criticism for the Soviet Union," he said. "This is very clearly a tool very pleasing to the Soviet leadership, very suited to them and treated by them in a friendly way." Referring to the proposal for a nuclear freeze, Chancellor Schmidt argued at the SPD Conference in Munich in 1982 that its acceptance would be equivalent to accepting the "unbelievable Soviet armada that is aimed at us." Countering voices calling for neutralism and those treating the United States and the Soviet Union as moral equals, he said that "German policy may not and can never be made for a position equidistant between Washington and Moscow. We stand on this side, on the side of free and equal people."

181. While the government's information programme has not entirely succeeded, in combination with the various arms control initiatives undertaken by the Reagan administration, it appears to have produced a reduction, by the latter half of 1982, in publicly expressed opposition to the 1979 decision. The Reagan proposals of November 1981, on INF talks and the subsequent initiation of negotiations have shifted public attention to Soviet actions, proposals, and reactions. The zero proposal fulfills the anti-nuclear movement's desires, in that it offers the possibility for not deploying LRTNF should the Soviet Union so wish. Of equal importance were the arms reduction proposals for strategic systems and the commencement of the START negotiations in June. With the new initiatives, the Reagan administration has somewhat redressed the balance of emphasis on military security and

[28] The Krefield Appeal was announced on 16th November, 1980, during a peace forum in Krefield. According to a CDU/CSU spokesman, this Appeal was evidently inspired during the meeting of a delegation of the German Peace Union (DFU) with the Soviet Committee of the World Peace Council, held in Moscow between 29th January and 4th February 1980, and then manipulated by the German Communist Party and what he called its "fellow travellers," "especially the 'German Peace Union (DFU),' 'Socialist German Workers Youth (SDAJ)' [The youth organisation of the Communist Party] 'the Marxist Student Union Spartakus (MSB)' and other organisations."

negotiations. It became clear that arms control, alongside modernisation, had re-established its place in U.S. nuclear policy. In this sense, several factors which fuelled earlier opposition in the Federal Republic were removed.

182. The Federal Republic's continuing insistence on the dual-track nature of the modernisation decision and on the importance of strategic negotiations to global stability as well as to public confidence, undoubtedly carried a certain weight with the Reagan administration while it was conducting its strategic review. Another important contribution was the Chancellor's meeting in February 1982 with Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev. During the meetings, President Brezhnev did, in fact, repeat his offer for a moratorium on deployment of new systems in Europe, as was expected, and added another offer: the Soviet Union would reduce unilaterally (by an unspecified number of unspecified weapons systems) Soviet intermediate range systems if the moratorium were accepted and NATO did not deploy. By all accounts of their meetings, Chancellor Schmidt performed valuable services for the Alliance by his firmness in support of the zero proposal and, conversely, his firmness that the NATO weapons would be deployed if the Geneva negotiations did not succeed in reaching the zero proposal; by his insistence that the United States was serious about the negotiations; by his admonitions to the Soviet leader about the destabilising effects of the Soviet military build-up; by his statements on the increase in international tensions caused by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He also reportedly warned President Brezhnev against trying to influence public opinion against the positions taken by their governments. The Schmidt-Brezhnev meetings were obviously very useful in reinforcing Alliance view-points on a series of issues.

183. In September 1982, the ruling coalition in the Federal Republic split over a series of issues primarily economic in nature. The new coalition partners, the CDU/CSU and the FDP, agreed on Mr. Helmut Kohl as Chancellor, and Mr. Kohl was elected the new FRG Chancellor through parliamentary procedures. In matters of foreign policy, Chancellor Kohl soon emphasised the basic continuity with past FRG policy his government would follow. He stated to a visiting high Soviet official that the FRG would work for "genuine détente," for example, and that if the Soviet Union did not agree in the Geneva INF negotiations to reduce its missiles, the FRG was determined to go forward with deployments in 1983.

The United Kingdom

184. The Conservative government of Mrs. Thatcher has consistently adopted a hard-line position towards the Soviet Union, with government actions running closely parallel to American policy. The government of Mrs. Thatcher fully supported the NATO proposal to respond to the Soviet build-up and continues to do so.

185. In the work of the High Level Group and in the evolution of the NATO modernisation proposal, the United Kingdom played an extremely active role, British officials were prominent in urging the importance of the December decision and in stressing the dangers of a failure by the Alliance to act decisively.

186. The United Kingdom has publicly announced its sites for the deployment of the 160 cruise missiles at two RAF bases located at Greenham Common (60 kms west of London) and Molesworth (90 kms north of London). Greenham Common will be the first operational site in the Alliance and should be ready for the first deployment of the Tomahawk GLCM in 1983.

187. Within the opposition political parties, the anti-nuclear sentiment has been restricted largely to the Left. The Labour Party is split between unilateralists. who want Britain to take the lead in nuclear disarmament, and the multilateralists, who prefer that disarmanent be carried out in the context of multilateral negotiations. At the 1981 Labour Party Conference in Brighten, the party voted to endorse an "unambiguous commitment to unilateral disarmament" and to declare its unconditional opposition to the deployment of cruise missiles and all other nuclear weapons in Britain. Multilaterialists pointed out, however, that the acceptance of the motion did not mean that it had become party policy, since a two-thirds majority on a card vote rather than voice vote would have been needed. However, at the 1982 conference, the unilateralists won decisively on this point. The Labour Party rejected deployments of any U.S. nuclear weapons in the United Kingdom and voted to eliminate eventually the U.K. nuclear forces. Since a vote of more than two-thirds was gained on these issues, the vote is binding on the Party and becomes the official Party position. As such, these positions must be considered for inclusion in the next campaign manifesto. The Labour Party made it as clear as it possibly could that the position was anti-nuclear, not anti-NATO: members voted overwhelmingly not to withdraw from NATO.

188. The Social Democratic-Liberal Alliance is split on the LRTNF isue. The SDP is in full support of the dual-track decision whereas the Liberals in their 1981 Conference voted to oppose "the deployment of cruise missiles in Europe and . . . as a first step, to reject and campaign against the siting of cruise misiles in Britain." The Liberal Party is itself divided on LRTNF and on NATO, with some arguing the party is not bound by conference decisions, including the decision on LRTNF, and the United Kingdom must remain in NATO; and others arguing against all nuclear weapons and for unilateral withdrawal from NATO. Both parties of the Social Democratic-Liberal Alliance reject the Trident nuclear modernisation programme.

189. The government has continued to stand by its decision to replace the Polaris nuclear deterrent with Trident submarines. In March 1982, Secretary of Defence John Nott announced that instead of opting for Trident C–4, the government had decided to buy Trident D–5. an even more advanced version. The Labour Party pledged that the "next Labour Government will cancel the Trident project." The decision to purchase the Trident–2 rather than the Trident–1 system re-opened the debate on British nuclear deterrent. This debate intensified in the wake of the Falklands conflict, when a number of voices, including government backbenchers, called for a reversal of the previously announced navy cuts and for an enlargement of the royal fleet. In order to pay for fleet enlargement, however, the government might have to review its Trident decision and the costs involved. The government, however, has stood firm on its decision and continues to do so.

190. The decision to accept cruise missiles and the more recent announcement of the purchase of the Trident D–5 missile to replace the Polaris deterrent force has sparked off a new wave of anti-nuclear feeling in the United Kingdom. Opposition to the possession of nuclear arms and the location of American nuclear bases on British soil is reported to be running higher than in the days of the "Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND)" in the 1950's. In a major rally in October 1981, about 150,000 people joined the CND sponsored demonstration opposing nuclear weapons, the largest of its kind ever in Britain. The movement has produced a spate of literature and articles arguing for and against the government's current position. Much of the argument has been evoked by the publication of a government handbook on civil defence, "Protect and Survive," which provoked a critical review of government policy by Oxford historian E. P. Thompson called "Protest and Survive." The CND continues to gain grass-root membership and shares many of the defence policy aims of the Labour Left.

Italy

191. The Christian Democratic government of Francesco Cossiga adopted a favourable position in 1979 on the NATO LRTNF modernisation proposal and on the deployment of cruise missile launchers on Italian territory. The government position was endorsed by the Italian Parliament when it approved the plan by 328 votes to 230.

192. The powerful Communist Party (PCI) found itself in a predicament, since the other parties suggested that its position on the LRTNF issue would be an appropriate test of its independence from Moscow and its support for NATO. The PCI, therefore adopted a position that, while opposed to the NATO proposal, acknowledged the existence of a problem concerning the military balance and suggested certain courses of action.

193. The Party directorate issued a statement on 28th November, 1980, in which the PCI proposed:

—to suspend any decision on the manufacture and deployment of new missiles, or at least postpone the question for 6 months or more;

—to call on the Soviet Union to suspend the manufacture and deployment of its SS–20 missiles;

—to open negotiations immediately on fixing a lower ceiling for the military balance which would guarantee mutual security.

194. The Italian Government has continued its commitment to the NATO dual-track decision and to the installation of cruise missiles. Following the Italian governmental crisis in May 1981, connected with the secret Masonic lodge known as P2, and the resignation of the Christian Democratic government headed by Arnaldo Forlani, Giovanni Spadolini of the Republican Party formed a new coalition composed of Republicans, Christian Democrats, Socialists, Social Democrats and Liberals. In presenting his programme to the Senate in his initial speech in early June 1981, Premier Spadolini came out strongly in favour of the NATO dual-track decision, favouring arms control negotiations, rejecting the Soviet moratorium proposal as "unacceptable in its present form," and stating that Italy's position was similar to

that of Chancellor Schmidt in approaching LRTNF modernisation as a deterrent to the SS–20s.

195. In August 1981, the Spadolini government announced that the site for the installation of the cruise missiles had been chosen—Comiso, on the Southern tip of Sicily. Because the government's announcement of the site choice almost coincided with the American announcement to continue production of the Enhanced Radiation Weapon, it caused some disturbance among parliamentarians of the Left. The special two-day session of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee convoked to discuss the two issues confirmed the government position with strong support.

196. Public opposition to the government's decision to accept the modernisation was, initially, notable for its absence. With the growth and increasing vocality of other European anti-nuclear movements, however, a more active opposition asserted itself in Italy. The Italian Communist Party is the only major political party opposing deployment, but rather than inspiring this newly voiced opposition, the Italian Communists appear to have thrown their support to the movement only after it had gained a certain momentum. In fact, one notable aspect of the Italian movement and the Communists' support of it, besides its relatively late birth, is its continuous emphasis on the dismantling of the Soviet SS–20s as well as on the non-deployment of NATO LRTNF. This equal emphasis on non-deployment by both East and West is notable because it is often lacking in other European Movements. In early June 1982, some 300,000 people demonstrated in Rome in opposition to the LRTNF deployments both by the Soviet Union and NATO. Several smaller demonstrations, similar in character, have taken place near Comiso, the Italian site for deployments.

The Netherlands

197. At the time of the NATO 1979 decision, the Dutch Government was composed of a coalition of the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA)—itself an alliance of three parties (the Anti-Revolutionary, Catholic People and Protestant parties)—and the Liberal Party (VVD), which is, in fact, considered conservative on many issues. In the 150-member Second Chamber, the coalition had a slim majority of two votes. The issue of new nuclear deployments had been the subject of intense public and parliamentary debate in the Netherlands, fanning a deep-rooted opposition to nuclear weapons among much of the Dutch population. The opposition was broadly based and represented a force the government could not ignore. The Liberal Party, the junior party in the coalition, strongly favoured deployment, as did the majority of the CDA. However, the number of CDA members strongly opposed to deployment was sufficient to ensure defeat if it came to a vote favouring deployment, since the main opposition party, Labour (PVDA), was almost unanimously opposed to the decision.

198. After difficult political negotiations, the government took the decision to support the NATO 12th December final Communiqué announcing the agreement of all members for the modernisation proposal. However, the Dutch Government added the reservation that the Netherlands would not agree to participate in deployment for 2 years.

199. The nuclear issue was considered central to the outcome of the May 1981 elections. Among the major political parties, the PVDA was unanimously opposed to deployment of LRTNF in the Netherlands, and the smaller Democrats '66 (D'66) were opposed "under the present circumstances," whereas the VVD strongly supported the NATO decision. The CDA took a middle position, arguing that progress in the Geneva INF negotiations, which it strongly supported, should be central to any decision.

200. The Labour Party, the largest of the opposition parties, had as a central plank in its platform for the May elections the rejection of NATO's modernisation plan and a radical reduction of Holland's six nuclear tasks. The central division in the Labour Party came over how many nuclear tasks should be eliminated. A proposal to abolish all nuclear tasks—a proposal supported by the majority of the Party—was only averted by the threatened resignation of the Party leader, Joop den Uly. The American failure to ratify SALT II was strongly criticised by the Party.

201. The results of the May 1981 election left this issue unresolved. The Christian Democratic Appeal lost one seat, the Liberals lost two seats, leaving the coalition a total of 74—two short of a majority. The Labour Party lost 9 seats, and smaller parties opposed to deployment gained.

202. Following the elections, a centre-left coalition was formed, composed of the CDA, PVDA, and D'66. Concerning the full implementation of the NATO 1979 dual-track decision, this coalition "agreed to disagree." In his investiture address before Parliament, Prime Minister van Agt made the following points with regard to the LRTNF modernisation question: the duel-track decision must not be altered and must remain the basis for negotiations; the government is still unable to lift earlier reservations with regard to stationing LRTNF on Dutch territory because negotiations will only be starting in the future; the government will refrain from taking any unilateral measures since any move to reduce nuclear weapons must be coordinated within the Alliance. Surviving a Cabinet crisis only one month after its formation, the coalition fell apart in May 1982, following disagreement on how to finance the budget deficit. An interim minority Cabinet of CDA and D'66 was formed until the September 8th, 1982 elections.

203. In the September 1982 elections, the centrality of the nuclear issue was replaced by concerns over the economy, though nuclear issues played a serious role. Party positions changed little, if any, regarding the NATO decision. The Liberals still favoured deployment, while the Labour Party (PVDA) was as much opposed as earlier. The PVDA continued to hold the position that a reduction in Holland's six nuclear tasks to two was desirable; D'66 was ambiguous on the issue, possibly willing to endorse deployment should the Geneva talks fail. The CDA, and, in particular, its leader, Prime Minister van Agt, appeared to have moved towards accepting deployments and the number of electable Christian Democrats unalterably opposed to the decision decreased. Again, however, the CDA made its final position contingent on progress in the Geneva talks. Before the election Mr. van Agt announced that, should his party join a new coalition, what-

ever its composition, such a coalition should not take a specific position on the nuclear issue. Instead, he urged that the issue should find its initiative on the parliamentary floor and be debated and voted there. Thus, even if the coalition partners split on the deployment issue, it would not bring down the government.

204. The results of the 8th September elections made the Labour Party (PVDA) the largest party in the Dutch parliament. The PVDA gained three seats in the election, bringing its total to 47 seats in the 150 member Second Chamber. The Christian Democratic Appeal lost 3 seats and now holds 45 seats. The largest gains were won by the Liberal Party, which added 10 seats, for a total of 36 seats. Democrats '66 lost 11 seats, and the remaining 16 seats are held by 8 smaller political parties. Following Dutch constitutional procedures, which require that the largest political party first be asked to form a government, Queen Beatrix asked PVDA leader Joop den Uyl to do so. Informed observers suggest it could be months before the negotiations for a new government are completed. The 8th September elections, then, again left the nuclear issue in Holland unresolved. Regarding the full implementation of the 1979 NATO decision, the only conclusion that can be drawn with certainty from the election results is that the Dutch people remain deeply divided and no consensus has been achieved on the deployment issue.

205. The anti-nuclear sentiment among the political parties is supported in Holland by several institutions and broader movements that help account for the strong anti-nuclear sentiment at the grass-roots level. Among these, religious institutions and polemological institutes play a key role. Perhaps the most important of these is the Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad (IKV), or the Interchurch Peace Council. With a membership of 15,000–20,000 and a grass-roots organisation, the IKV has as its aim to stop the arms race by "unilateral initiatives leading to multilateral disarmament" and to exert influence on the political parties to move in this direction. The basis of the IKV argument is that nuclear weapons are immoral and, by unilateral disarmament, the Netherlands could provide a revolutionary example that other countries might follow. In November 1980, the synod of the Dutch Reformed Church publicly endorsed unilateral nuclear disarmament. A Roman Catholic organisation, Pax Christi, also has a strong anti-nuclear element, but is far less powerful than the IKV. A third organisation, relatively insignificant in numbers but potentially influential, is the Army Peace and Security Council (Het Vredes en Veiligheid Beraad Drijgsmacht) which, among its other activities, has conducted surveys of the attitudes of the military services toward deployment of nuclear weapons. Other anti-nuclear groups include the Communist-leaning "Stop the Neutron Bomb," the Humanist Peace Council, Women for Peace and Women Against Nuclear Weapons.

206. An IKV-sponsored peace demonstration in Amsterdam in November 1981 attracted 400,000 people—the largest demonstration of its kind in Western Europe. The Dutch anti-nuclear movement has also co-sponsored and participated in demonstrations in Germany and the United Kingdom. The IKV, however, declined to participate in the Bonn rally in June 1982 at the time of the NATO Summit.

It argue that it could not support the general anti-NATO tone, what it considered German nationalistic overtones; or the one-sided-

ness of the demonstrations—the last being exemplified by the lack of any mention of the Soviet SS–20 in rally literature. The official IKV position is not as one-sided in its opposition as it perceived the Bonn demonstration, but instead attempts to provide logical, well-informed arguments against nuclear weapons.

207. In late August 1982, Pax Christi and the IKV both became involved in a major political uproar. Both groups recommended that their followers and sympathisers vote for Labour or for the smaller Left-wing parties in the 8th September elections to ensure non-deployment of LRTNF. Their action was widely condemned by the main political parties as interference in politics by religious, single-issue groups. The head of Pax Christi, the Bishop of Breda, publicly disassociated himself and condemned the recommendations.

208. The Amsterdam demonstration in November 1981 seems to have been the high point in the Dutch anti-nuclear protest, at least up to now. The initial momentum of the anti-nuclear opposition is considered difficult to maintain, in part because new ideas and objectives are not forthcoming, in part because proposals for alternative defense arrangements have proven divisive. Movement leaders frankly admit that its most significant success to date has been the deferral of the government's decision on the LRTNF modernisation issue.

Belgium

209. For the past few years, Belgium has been preoccupied with a number of internal problems directly related to the friction between the Flemish and Walloon communities. This tension has been exacerbated by steadily worsening economic conditions.

210. During the period of preparation and consultation that preceded the NATO 12th December decision, it was confidently thought that the coalition government would endorse the proposal and accept the deployment of cruise missiles on Belgian territory. But domestic opposition to the deployment of cruise missiles had manifested itself, particularly among the Flemish Socialists, and prior to the 12th December NATO ministerial meeting, the issue of cruise missiles had scarcely been debated in the government, then consisting of the Flemish and Walloon sections of the Christian Democrat and Socialist Parties, and the Francophone Front. The Cabinet met on the morning of 12th December in order to reach a decision. Their decision was presented to the NATO ministers by Foreign Minister Henri Simonet who, noting the consensus of the meeting and confident of the future Belgian decision, endorsed the modernisation decision, saying that the Belgian Government would *confirm* the application of the decision for Belgian territory in 6 months in the light of progress on arms control. However, the Belgian Cabinet had endorsed the modernisation decision saying it would *take* its decision on the application to Belgian territory in 6 months in the light of progress on arms control.

211. Following a government crisis in April 1980, the coalition government collapsed and Mr. Simonet ceased to be Foreign Minister. After month-long negotiations, a new coalition government of six political groups was formed and immediately became preoccupied with the linguistic issue and the deteriorating Belgian economy. Consequently, during the meeting of the NATO foreign ministers in Ankara in June 1980, the Belgian Government requested an extension.

212. In September 1980, the government issued a declaration regarding the deployment of cruise missiles on Belgian territory. The operative paragraphs of this declaration read:

> The government hopes that the talks will lead to positive results and that, more especially, the balance of theatre nuclear weapons will be maintained at the lowest possible level. Belgium will spare no effort to make the maximum contribution to this end.
>
> In order to facilitate the conduct of the negotiations, the government declares that Belgium is here and now prepared to accept the outcome of the negotiations with the Soviet Union and to execute its role within the context of the Alliance.
>
> Should the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union not succeed, Belgium, in concert with its Allies, will take all the measures agreed upon by the NATO partners.
>
> For this purpose, the government will examine the state and progress of the negotiations every 6 months in conjunction with its Allies and draw the necessary conclusions in the context of the Alliance. Parliament will be kept informed regularly.

213. The ambiguous wording of the declaration allowed both supporters and opponents of deployment to claim victory.

214. The present government, formed in December 1981, has endorsed the 6-month review option formulated in September 1980 and, within the self-imposed restrictions of the compromise, is supporting both tracks of the 1979 decision. During a press conference in late March 1982, the Minister of Defence, Mr. Vreven, reiterated pertinent comments made in parliament by Prime Minister Martens in December 1981: "The government will not await the end of the (Geneva INF) negotiations before moving to an evaluation if these negotiations last more than 6 months. I have said that these first 6 months will begin on 1st January. It is therefore possible that, at the end of this first period, not only will an evaluation be made, but also a decision taken. Thus, we will not await the full conclusion of the negotiations." The Minister also indicated that Belgium was actively studying the infrastructure requirements in the event deployment became necessary. With reference to an agreement on the "zero option," Minister of External Affairs Mr. Tindermans argued in the Belgian Senate in July that "the Allies must stick together and be determined to prepare for the deployment which they hope to make pointless."

215. The Flemish Socialists continue to be the party most strongly opposed to deployment. In the past, they have made opposition to deployment one of the points on which they participate in the government and their political leaders now have considerable political investment in the issue. The leader of the Flemish Party, Karl Van Miert, sees the NATO decision as an example of overwhelming American pressure on the Europeans and stresses that deployment in Belgium is linked to a possible agreement with the Soviet Union. Since serious negotiations began only in November 1981 and no progress has been announced, he maintains that Belgium is not now obliged to accept deployment of the missiles. The French Socialists for the most part do not oppose deployment, but would find it difficult to participate in a government if the Flemish Socialists maintained their adamant opposition.

216. Because of the fragility of coalition politics and the severe economic strains in Belgium it is difficult, on the one hand to see how the government will be in a position to take a firm decision on cruise missile deployment in the near future. On the other hand, a very large majority of Belgian officials and politicians strongly support the NATO dual-track decision, reject the notion that Belgian postponement is indefinite, and strongly stress Belgian solidarity with the Alliance and its willingness to take all steps necessary to counteract what is perceived as an increasing Soviet threat.

Meetings in the Netherlands, March 1982

217. The Centre-Left coalition government that emerged after the May 1981 elections in Holland was composed of the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), the Labour Party, and Democrats '66 (D'66). A wide gamut of nuclear concerns was evident among these parties. These range from strong opposition to nuclear weapons in general and the need to stop a nuclear arms race to demands for a reduction of Holland's six nuclear tasks and a more general reduction of nuclear weapons; from disagreement with the 1979 decision because the number of weapons is too high and is seen to encourage a European regional balance, to total opposition to deployment.

218. Concerning the full implementation of the NATO 1979 dual-track decision, the coalition "agreed to disagree." The Christian Democratic Appeal and Democrats '66 might support a deployment decision under certain conditions, but the Labour Party was wholly opposed to deployment and would bring down the government rather than support a positive decision to deploy. As a result, the decision to deploy postponed. Progress in the Geneva Intermediate Nuclear Force talks was crucial to any decision.

219. It must be noted that Holland is maintaining its political position in a balanced way. In a response to a parliamentary question on cruise missile site surveys in the Netherlands on 11th February, Defence Minister Hans Van Mierlo stated that while the Dutch deployment decision was distant, Holland was responding "passively" to official NATO requests concerning "legal and technical" aspects of possible deployment. His answer would appear to keep open the Netherlands option on deployment and set the stage for preliminary site survey work, so that the deployment option is not, de facto, excluded.

220. The refusal to agree to deployment now is not perceived by opponents as damaging the solidarity of the Alliance or as undermining the negotiations in Geneva. While it is granted that Alliance determination to fully implement the 1979 decision has brought the Soviet Union to the negotiating table. Alliance determination is not considered the sole cause. Some Dutch argue that they would indeed be undermining solidarity and negotiations if they had rejected the very basis of the negotiations. They have not done so; in fact they have supported the Geneva Intermediate Nuclear Force negotiations. They certainly do not favour unilateral disarmament. They tend to justify their refusal to take the deployment decision now as a signal to the NATO Allies that people (the Dutch, in particular) can no longer live with nuclear weapons as easily as they could in the past; that people are reaching their psychological limits; that NATO has relied too easily

and too much on nuclear weapons; and that the uneasiness, or fear, or insecurity, to which one is more susceptible in areas of high population density, caused by the proliferation of nuclear weapons has implications for future planning that NATO as an Alliance must consider carefully. The grass-roots nature of the anti-nuclear opposition was often noted.

221. Continued strong Dutch participation in NATO, at least among the political party leaders with whom the Committee met, is striking, and calls into question the whole notion of "Hollanditis" with its alleged characteristics of pacifism and neutralism. Neither of the latter two was at all in evidence among the politicians, with whom very frank discussions were held. Pacifism and neutralism may be tendencies in some of the anti-nuclear groups, but even the most powerful Dutch anti-nuclear group, which officially holds the position that the two military blocs should gradually be dissolved, does not endorse Dutch withdrawal from NATO at this time. There is some thought being given in the anti-nuclear movement to the eventual denuclearization of Holland as a first step, but the significance of this particular thought even in the anti-nuclear movement is not major at this time and the predominant significance of this thought is, in any case, to send a political signal to the Allies.

222. There is a strong and apparently growing concern in Holland about short-range nuclear weapons. Their battlefield usefulness is suspect: their number is considered dangerously large; their proliferation is considered thoughtless; their military rationale is considered artifically constructed after the event. The long-held reasoning of a nuclear supplement for conventional weakness is being carefully scrutinized and found deficient. It is thought that the number of short-range nuclear systems could be significantly reduced without any damage to Alliance defense. Some unilateral reductions might be implemented, though unilateral disarmament in this area is generally viewed with caution. Opinions vary on how many such weapons may be needed, their deterrent value, and their military usefulness. However, there is a strong consensus in Holland that the Alliance needs an overall policy review of every aspect of short-range nuclear systems and, as a result of the review, a renewed emphasis on strengthening conventional forces and possibly replacing short-range nuclear weapons with conventional substitutes if necessary. In respect to the need for a review, and in respect to the future decision on deployment of cruise missiles, it was noted with some discomfort that the High Level Group, which would be the proper Alliance forum for such a review and discussion, had not met very frequently during the last year.

Meetings in France, March 1982

223. The French nuclear forces are officially described as independent, strategic, credible, and sufficient. *Independent:* they are under solely French control to serve France's vital national interests. *Strategic:* they are considered not as intermediate-range nuclear forces, but are forces capable of striking a potential aggressor's homeland. They are *credible* to protect France's vital interests, with a second strike capability, and they are *sufficient* to implement France's nuclear doctrine.

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224. Traditional French nuclear doctrine differs significantly from that of the United States and NATO. France has never accepted the doctrine of flexible response, though its nuclear weapons systems are sufficiently flexible to allow something less than immediate massive retaliation.

225. The French notion of deterrence differs from that of the United States and NATO as well. Because its nuclear forces are not on the same scale of magnitude as those of the United States or the Soviet Union, France contributes to overall deterrence in two ways: first, by making its defence of French national interests undeniably clear; secondly, as the 1974 Ottawa Declaration acknowledged, by multiplying the risks and uncertainties for a potential aggressor.

226. French nuclear forces are non-negotiable. For the French, there is no scenario imaginable in which their nuclear forces could be brought into United States-Soviet strategic arms negotiations for two basic reasons. First, it would be a reversal of the Ottawa declaration, since French forces would be considered auxiliary to or dependent on United States nuclear forces, thus reducing the centres of uncertainty; French forces are independent and national. Secondly, French nuclear forces are considered so small in comparison to those of the United States and the Soviet Union that any reduction could damage their credibility

227. Because French nuclear forces are national, independent, and strategic, it is also inconceivable that they be brought into Intermediate Nuclear Force negotiations, such as those now taking place in Geneva. French officials are adamant in rejecting any suggestion that at the Geneva Intermediate Nuclear Force negotiations any compensation, direct or indirect, be given to the Soviet Union to balance French nuclear forces. They expressed concern with such suggestions and consider the rationale for compensation a Soviet tactic.

228. This is not to say that the French Government is unconcerned about arms control. It is in French interest that the East-West forces be balanced at as low a level as possible. Moreover, it is precisely because of its concern with arms control issues that the French Government advanced in 1978 and continues to support a Conference on European Disarmament (CDE) within the context of the CSCE.

229. While the present French Government, led by President François Mitterand, has supported the main lines of traditional French nuclear policy, it has also been noticeably stronger in its support of the NATO 1979 dual-track decision than the previous government. The central reason for this appears to lie in a reassessment of the balance of forces assuring the defence of Europe.

The present government sees the balance as deteriorating in favour of the East, with the consequence that part of Europe is beginning to worry about its security. France may be able to defend itself well, but alone it cannot rectify the East-West imbalance. Hence the dual-track decision of December 1979 is perceived as an "equalisation of risks" necessary to counter the Soviet modernisation programme. The French Government strongly supports both tracks. Without the deployment decision, the Soviet Union, with its sharp increase in intermediate nuclear forces, might believe it could hold Europe hostage, and, as mentioned above, an ensured global balance of forces at reduced levels is clearly in French national interests.

230. Procurement of new nuclear systems has been increased by the Socialist Government of François Mitterand. In the 1982 defence budget, allocations were made for a seventh nuclear submarine, and there is some discussion about the need for an eighth. "*Inflexible*," the sixth nuclear submarine, will enter service in 1985. Of the five nuclear submarines now in operation, two or three are always at sea, giving the French *force de frappe* a second-strike capability of 32–48 missiles. With the possible exception of the first submarine, all submarines are fitted or will be refitted with the new M4 multiple warhead missiles. extending the range from 3,000 to 4,500 kilometres. The French strategic forces include as well 18 missiles stationed at plateau d'Albion, and 45 Mirage IV. French tactical nuclear forces are comprised of 60 nuclear tactical aircraft based on two aircraft carriers and 80 Pluto tactical nuclear missiles. During the 1980's a new tactical nuclear missile, with a longer range, the Hades, will gradually replace the Pluto. Although the government has not yet decided whether to build and produce neutron warheads, research on the weapon will continue. The total nuclear force is estimated by French officials at 77 megatons. French officials stated that the government planned to maintain the sufficiency of the French force de frappe, primarily through modernisation, but it does not plan to increase it appreciably during the coming decade.

231. France's nuclear policy enjoys widespread political, public, and budgetary support. There is no significant anti-nuclear movement in France.

ANNEX I

TABLE 1.—U.S. AND EUROPEAN SYSTEMS WITH U.S. WARHEADS, 1981

	Number of systems [1]	Number of warheads [2]
Aircraft:		
United States F–111	152	304
United States and European (F–4, F–16, F–104)	510	765
Total		1,069
Artillery:		
United States and European (203-mm and 155-mm)	1,000	2,000
Missiles:		
Pershing Ia	180	270
Lance and Honest John	100	910
Total		1,180
Air defense and ADMS		[3] 1,750
Total		5,999

[1] Unless noted, these figures are from the 1982 Report of the NATO Secretary General, NATO and Warsaw Pact Force Comparisons; IISS, Military Balance, 1981–1982.

[2] The assumptions as to warheads are taken from J. J. Martin, "Trends and Asymmetries in the Theater Nuclear Balance." For aircraft: 2 for F–111 and 1.5 for F–4, F–104, F–16. For missile reloads: 10 for Honest John; 9 for Lance; 1.5 for Pershing. For artillery, two rounds per howitzer.,

[3] Since the overall number of U.S. warheads in Europe is approximately 6,000, the number of warheads for nuclear air defense (Nike Hercules) and atomic demolition munitions (ADM's) must be approximately 1,750, if the other estimates are correct.

Source: This table is taken from Dr. Lynn Davis, "A Political Strategy for Supplementing the 1970 NATO Decision on Theatre Nuclear Forces."

ANNEX II

COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT A SPECIAL MEETING OF THE NATO FOREIGN AND DEFENCE MINISTERS IN BRUSSELS ON 12TH DECEMBER, 1979

1. At a special meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers in Brussels on December 12, 1979:

2. Ministers recalled the May 1978 Summit where governments expressed the political resolve to meet the challenges to their security posed by the continuing momentum of the Warsaw Pact military build-up.

3. The Warsaw Pact has over the years developed a large and growing capability in nuclear systems that directly threaten Western Europe and have a strategic significance for the Alliance in Europe. This situation has been especially aggravated over the last few years by Soviet decisions to implement programs modernizing and expanding their long-range nuclear capability substantially. In particular, they have deployed the SS–20 missile, which offers significant improvements over previous systems in providing greater accuracy, more mobility, and greater range, as well as having multiple warheads, and the Backfire bomber, which has a much better performance than other Soviet aircraft deployed hitherto in a theater role. During this period, while the Soviet Union has been reinforcing its superiority in Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) both quantitatively and qualitatively, Western LRTNF capabilities have remained static. Indeed these forces are increasing in age and vulnerability and do not include land-based, long-range theater nuclear missile systems.

4. At the same time, the Soviets have also undertaken a modernization and expansion of their shorter range TNF and greatly improved the overall quality of their conventional forces. These developments took place against the background of increasing Soviet intercontinental capabilities and achievement of parity in intercontinental capability with the United States.

5. These trends have prompted serious concern within the Alliance, because, if they were to continue, Soviet superiority in theater nuclear systems could undermine the stability achieved in intercontinental systems and cast doubt on the credibility of the Alliance's deterrent strategy by highlighting the gap in the spectrum of NATO's available nuclear response to aggression.

6. Ministers noted that these recent developments require concrete actions on the part of the Alliance if NATO's strategy of flexible response is to remain credible. After intensive consideration, including the merits of alternative approaches, and after taking note of the positions of certain members, Ministers concluded that the overall interest of the Alliance would best be served by pursuing two parallel and complementary approaches of TNF modernization and arms control.

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7. Accordingly ministers have decided to modernize NATO's LRTNF by the deployment in Europe of U.S. ground-launched systems comprising 108 Pershing II launchers, which would replace existing U.S. Pershing I–A, and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM), all with single warheads. All the nations currently participating in the integrated defence structure will participate in the programme: the missiles will be stationed in selected countries and certain support costs will be met through NATO's existing common funding arrangements. The program will not increase NATO's reliance upon nuclear weapons.

In this connection, ministers agreed that as an integral part of TNF modernization, 1,000 U.S. nuclear warheads will be withdrawn from Europe as soon as feasible. Further, ministers decided that the 572 LRTNF warheads should be accommodated within that reduced level, which necessarily implies a numerical shift of emphasis away from warheads for delivery systems of other types and shorter ranges. In addition they noted with satisfaction that the Nuclear Planning Group is undertaking an examination of the precise nature, scope and basis of the adjustments resulting from the LRTNF deployment and their possible implications for the balance of roles and systems in NATO's nuclear armory as a whole. This examination will form the basis of a substantive report to NPG ministers in the autumn of 1980.

8. Ministers attach great importance to the role of arms control in contributing to a more stable military relationship between East and West and in advancing the process of détente. This is reflected in a broad set of initiatives being examined within the Alliance to further the course of arms control and détente in the 1980's. Ministers regard arms control as an integral part of the Alliance's efforts to assure the undiminished security of its member States and to make the strategic situation between East and West more stable, more predictable, and more manageable at lower levels of armaments on both sides. In this regard they welcome the contribution which the SALT II Treaty makes toward achieving these objectives.

9. Ministers consider that, building on this accomplishment and taking account of the expansion of Soviet LRTNF capabilities of concern to NATO, arms control efforts to achieve a more stable overall nuclear balance at lower levels of nuclear weapons on both sides should therefore now include certain United States and Soviet long-range theater nuclear systems.

This would reflect previous Western suggestions to include such Soviet and U.S. systems in arms control negotiations and more recent expressions by Soviet President Brezhnev of willingness to do so. Ministers fully support the decision taken by the United States following consultations within the Alliance to negotiate arms limitations on LRTNF and to propose to the U.S.S.R. to begin negotiations as soon as possible along the following lines which have been elaborated in intensive consultations within the Alliance:

A. Any future limitations on U.S. systems principally designed for theater missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theater systems.

B. Limitations on United States and Soviet long-range theater nuclear systems should be negotiated bilaterally in the SALT II framework in a step-by-step approach.

C. The immediate objective of these negotiations should be the establishment of agreed limitations on United States and Soviet land-based long-range theater nuclear missile systems.

D. Any agreed limitations on these systems must be consistent with the principle of equality between the sides. Therefore, the limitations should take the form of de jure equality in ceilings and in rights.

E. Any agreed limitations must be adequately verifiable.

10. Given the special importance of these negotiations for the overall security of the Alliance, a special consultative body at a high level will be constituted within the Alliance to support the U.S. negotiating effort. This body will follow the negotiations on a continuous basis and report to the Foreign and Defense Ministers who will examine developments in these negotiations as well as in other arms control negotiations at their semiannual meetings.

11. The Ministers have decided to pursue these two parallel and complementary approaches in order to avert an arms race in Europe caused by the Soviet TNF buildup, yet preserve the viability of NATO's strategy of deterrence and defense and thus maintain the security of its member States.

A. A modernization decision, including a commitment to deployments is necessary to meet NATO's deterrence and defense needs, to provide a credible response to unilateral Soviet TNF deployments, and to provide the foundation for the pursuit of serious negotiations on TNF.

B. Success of arms control in constraining the Soviet buildup can enhance Alliance security, modify the scale of NATO's TNF requirements, and promote stability and détente in Europe in consonnance with NATO's basic policy of deterrence, defense and détente as enunciated in the Harmel Report. NATO's TNF requirements will be examined in the light of concrete results reached through negotiations.

ANNEX III

RESOLUTION ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE

(Adopted by the North Atlantic Assembly on October 16, 1981)

The Assembly,

Recognising the far-reaching significance of the NATO 12 December 1979 "dual-track" decision in several respects:

—to enhance NATO's strategy of flexible response by producing a visible "coupling" of the American strategic deterrent and European defence;

—to provide a much-needed response to modernised and expanded Soviet long-range theatre nuclear forces (LRTNF);

—to facilitate permanent limitations on LRTNF through arms control negotiations;

—to demonstrate Alliance political cohesion and solidarity in risk sharing;

Welcoming the determination of member governments to sustain the consensus behind the 12 December "dual-track" decision;

Noting that the deployment of the SS–20 is continuing beyond the levels predicted in 1979, while stressing that the number of LRTNF required by NATO should not be directly tied to Soviet force levels;

Noting the recent threat assessment by the High Level Group on the extent and pace of Soviet SS–20 deployment and on Soviet modernisation at all levels of theatre nuclear forces;

Welcoming the announcement that negotiations on LRTNF between the United States and the Soviet Union will commence on 30 November 1981;

Noting that a continued commitment to modernisation is essential if real progress in arms control is to be achieved;

Stressing that limitations on LRTNF will not provide stability unless achieved within a framework of limitations on central strategic systems;

Recognising that a "zero outcome", the mutual elimination of the land-based missile component of LRTNF—however difficult to achieve—represents the ideal objective of negotiations;

Concerned that confusion exists about (a) the relationship between modernisation and arms control; (b) the precise objective of the LRTNF negotiations; and (c) the extent to which NATO deployments depend upon Soviet actions and the results of arms control negotiations;

Concerned that the growth of opposition in several European countries to the dual track decision could undermine NATO's negotiating position and Alliance cohesion and could inadvertently serve Soviet purposes;

Urges member governments:

1. to maintain an equal emphasis on the twin objectives of modernisation and arms control.

2. to develop and maintain a unified Allied negotiating position on LRTNF arms control.

3. to undertake concerted efforts to persuade their publics that the dual-track decision constitutes a strategy for achieving military stability and sustaining peace in Europe.

Urges the United States Administration:

1. to continue consultations with its Alliance partners of LRTNF arms control and also on future theatre nuclear force modernisation requirements.

2. to proceed as now planned to undertake early negotiations with the Soviet Union on the limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear arms.

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